SANDRA HARDING

Part 1 - Sandra Harding, Feminist Ethics and the Science Question in Feminism

Sandra Harding is an American philosopher of feminist and postcolonial theory, epistemology, research methodology and philosophy of science. She is currently a professor at the UCLA Graduate School of Education and Information Studies.

Sandra Harding proposes that the Social Sciences serve as the foundational science. An adequate science requires a scientific study of the social beliefs and practices of scientists themselves. But natural scientists, with their fixation upon physical sciences as the foundational model for all sciences, have created the myth of a value-free, neutral science where social beliefs and practices are irrelevant. The myth is best captured in the separation of the context of discovery from the context of justification and then the relegation of the context of discovery to an insignificant side issue. As a result of the myth, scientists do not understand the "real causes and meanings" of their own work.

Part 2 - Sandra Harding, Feminism and the Social Sciences

According to Harding, the social sciences, such as history, sociology, and anthropology, provide a more sound foundation for science than the physical sciences. They present a more "naturalistic" approach to science. The social sciences can deconstruct or strip away the veneer of scientific rationality that misleads physical scientists and philosophers of science into presuming the objective nature of their accounts. For example, whereas physical scientists may believe that the methods developed during the rise of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represent a triumph of purely objective, intellectual advancement and were the cause of subsequent social progress, the social sciences can show that "changes underway in the late feudal and early modern European social life were primarily responsible for the popular acceptance of sciences new ways of conceptualizing nature and inquiry. On a deeper level, the social sciences can reveal how race, class, and gender have skewed science in particular directions. Harding writes:

"But our contemporary social theory, influenced by psychoanalytic concerns, also reveals the distinctively Western masculine desires that are satisfied by the preoccupation with method, rule and law governed behavior and activity. Here, too, modern science projects onto nature distinctively Western masculine projects and destinies."

(The Science Question in Feminism, p. 229)


Part 3 - Sandra Harding, Feminism and Physics

Harding sees the attempt to set up physics as the foundational science to be misguided. She writes,

Why then should we take as the model for all knowledge - seeking a science that has no conceptual space for considering irrational behavior and belief? Moreover, possible explanations even in physics would be more reliable, more fruitful, if physicists were trained to examine critically the social origins and often-rrational social implications of their conceptual systems. For instance, would not physicists benefit from asking why a scientific worldview with physics as its paradigm excludes the history of physics from its recommendation that we seek causal explanations of everything in the world around us?

(p. 47)

Part 4 - Sandra Harding, Feminism, the Social Sciences and Gender

According to Harding, there is an Androcentric Bias in the Social Sciences. Harding cites feminist studies in the social sciences that show a male centered or Androcentric bias, which is both conceptual and political in traditional science. Conceptually, masculine identity favors rational thinking over feeling, the abstract and general over the concrete and particular, the separation of knowledge itself from its social issues, the separation of the subject from what is observed, the domination of the subject over the object, and objectivity over subjectivity.

So male scientists framed the conceptual structure of science to fit the needs of masculine identity. Accordingly, there is nothing surprising in the reliance on physics as a paradigm for all science, in the exclusive concern with the context of justification rather with the context of discovery, in the assumption of neutral or value-free scientific objectivity. Rather than being a reflection of reality, the traditional conceptual structure of science reflects the male ego.

Androcentric science demeans the status of women by ignoring their interests and excluding feminist oriented methodology. It devalues the special advantages women bring to scientific study, such as the value of experiential relations with others, the appreciation of feelings in social life, an understanding of practical life activities, and direct experience of the social harm resulting through the separation of abstract knowledge from its oppressive social uses.

Part 5 - Sandra Harding, Feminism, and Androcentric Science

Politically, Androcentric science focuses upon domination. The object of the domination in such a scientific approach may be in relation to nature, race, class, or sexuality. This domination has little concern for or sensitivity to the consequences of such domination. Environmental or ecological problems can occur as a consequence when this domination is practiced in relationship to the environment. Another result of this domination is social oppression with respect to race, class and gender. The entry of more women into science in contemporary times meets political resistance from male scientists because it threatens their sense of masculine identity. So as a defense mechanism, they require that women assume a masculine identity in the form of scientific rationality as a prerequisite for doing scientific work. In other words, women are forced to surrender their feminine identity in order to become scientists.

The development of scientific rationality during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries was accompanied by the desire of men to achieve dominance over women. Harding finds it significant that modern science arose at a time following the social breakdown in feudal society, when women were emerging to participate more fully in public life. Science was a way of meeting the threat that the emerging activity of women posed.

Part 6 - Sandra Harding, Feminism and Gender Symbolism

Gender metaphors are key indicators of the Androcentric bias in science according to Harding. A prime example is the use of rape and torture metaphor by Francis Bacon (561-1626). Bacon is usually regarded as one of the great founders of the modern scientific method. In explaining the new method and referring to nature in feminine terms, as was usually done, Bacon wrote about the need to "hound nature in her wanderings", to "lead and drive her," and to have no scruples about "entering and penetrating into those holes and corners", all in the interest of pursuing truth.

Even in the 1960's the Nobel Prize winning physicist Richard Feynman felt no reservations in likening acceptance of a scientific theory to falling in love with a woman having faults not immediately obvious according to Harding. And, in time, the theory's "become an old lady, who has very little that's attractive left in her, and the young today will not have their hearts pound when they look at her anymore."

Part 7 - Sandra Harding, Feminism and A Feminist Successor Science

To eliminate the Androcentric bias in science, according to Harding, we need much more than an increased number of women scientists. If more women become scientists but adopt the Standard Scientific Explanation, then nothing will change in the field of science. She, therefore, proposes a feminist successor science. At this point, Harding does not think that the boundaries of this successor science are clearly discernible. Yet there are key features that emerge. The social sciences not the physical sciences will provide the foundational paradigm. Science must be focused upon the context of discovery. The manner in which the sciences are used, and their social/political effects, will become more important than abstract conceptions of knowledge for its own sake.

The special methodological interests of women, such as the value of experiential relations with others, the appreciation of feelings in social life, and an understanding of practical life activities, will take the place of excessively quantitative studies and separations that isolate the scientific investigator from the subjects of study. Value concerns will then replace value neutrality. Science will benefit from the unique experiences and understandings that women being to the presentation of problems as well as to the collection and evaluation of data. As both victims and acknowledgers of Androcentric bias in science, feminist have an advantage over men in correcting "bad" science.










Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State; Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism.

FEMINIST ETHICS

There is no one standard presentation of feminist philosophy of feminist ethics. In short it may be said of feminist philosophy that it "refuses to identify the human experience with the male experience." (Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 305)

Advocates of the feminist philosophical perspective contend that traditional philosophical approaches are inadequate in that these approaches represent exclusively the male perspective. In addition, the traditional male oriented approach to philosophy in general and ethical theory in particular neglects the feminine understandings and perceptions of philosophical concerns. Finally, the traditional approach also fails to grant an equal status to the feminine understanding of philosophical concerns and solutions and dismisses the feminist approach as not only inadequate but inferior which in itself reflects the presuppositions lying behind the male hierarchical and rational approach to philosophy and ethics.

It should be pointed out that there is no one standard presentation of feminist ethics. The following material will focus upon three feminist proposals regarding the task of ethics. First we will examine Nel Noddings approach which is known as an ethic of caring. Second we will review Catherine A. MacKinnon's approach that specifically addresses a feminist theory of the state. Finally, we will explore the work of Sandra Harding feminist perspective of science.


PART 1: NEL NODDINGS: AN ETHIC OF CARING

Nel Noddings feminist understanding of the ethical task is known as an ethic of caring. She contrasts two approaches to the challenges of ethical thinking.

On the one hand, Noddings criticizes the standard male-dominated perspective, which, according to Noddings, focuses upon the use of principles in ethics. This particular approach tends to typically be the approach of the father in Noddings opinion. This male reliance on principles in ethics involves reason, detachment, inflexible rules, moral judgments and universalizability. The downside of this approach, according to Noddings is its tendency to produce dangerous self-righteousness and even violence.

On the other hand, Noddings acknowledges the ethical approach, which relies upon caring. This approach tends to represent the approach of the mother. The issues of human caring, the memory of caring and of being cared for form the foundation for ethics in Noddings' approach.

This approach is also characterized by receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness which characteristics are basic to caring. In giving reasons for ethical actions, women, according to Noddings, focus upon feelings, needs, personal impressions, and a sense of personal ideal rather than upon principles. Ethical caring under this paradigm of the ethics of caring emerges from a natural caring, which is characterized by the context of a relationship in which we respond through love or natural inclination.


PART 2: NODDINGS AND THE "ONE CARING"

Noddings focuses upon what she terms as "the one caring" on the one hand, and "the cared for" on the other. The one-caring represents the subject in the ethical relationship, whereas the cared-for" represents the object or the recipient of the care in the ethical relationship.

With regard to the one-caring, she contends that there is a receptive mode of "feeling with" someone that is to be distinguished from empathy. The one-caring is engrossed in the wellbeing and the welfare of the one cared-for. Any objective reasoning in the one-caring must be constantly refocused on the concrete and the personal.

For instance, in Kierkegaard's story of Abraham considering the sacrifice of Isaac in the Old Testament, a woman as one-caring would never even consider sacrificing a son for God or for a greater good, neither for the benefit of others. The story itself is reflective of the traditional male dominated reason based, principle oriented and more detached approach to relationships and to the ethical task. Any attempt to take seriously killing one's own child for the sake of some principle of abstraction violates the one caring relationship with the cared for according to Noddings.

There are limits however which the one-caring must acknowledge. The one caring is most concerned with an inner circle of cared-fors and is not responsible for everyone. In addition, there are circles of personal regard of lesser significance and circles of strangers who may or may not take on caring. In addition, the one caring cannot extend this caring to a general humanitarian altruism. Further the ethical ideal for each of us must be realistic and attainable, both in keeping with my past and open enough to accommodate future change. I cannot care for everyone and I have to care for myself without overwhelming myself with burdens toward others. Indeed, according to Noddings, there is the danger that I cease to care when others become too much of a burden.


PART 3: NODDINGS AND THE "CARED FOR"

On the other hand, Noddings also speaks of "the cared for." She contends that the one-caring should avoid excessive permissiveness as well as manipulation in dealing with the cared-for. There is a complete focus on the cared for, but not in a way that ignores the interests that reflect the one cared-for or ignores dangerous and potentially harmful acts on the part of the cared- for. The cared-for must exhibit a certain amount of receptivity and recognition of the one-caring in order for the caring relationship to be completed.

There must be a sort of reciprocity on the part of the one cared-for in the sense of sharing aspirations and accomplishments with the one-caring. While there may be a likelihood of inequality in caring relationships for example in the relationships between parent and child, teacher and student or therapist and client, this inequality should be perceived not in terms of a hierarchy of superior to inferior which reflects the male perspective, but rather should reflect a relationship which is more similar to friendship. In addition, the cared-for should be free to pursue his or her own interests but should also be responsible to the caring relationship with the one caring.

Noddings proposes that natural caring gives a basic sense of "the good." Ethical caring is a combination of natural caring with our best memories of past instances of caring and being cared for. Ethical caring gives rise to an ethical ideal or a vision of our best self-possible in ethical caring in Noddings' approach. We become ethical selves as we care for others and are cared-for and consequently we develop a sense of fulfillment and completed identity.

Also, Noddings reminds that in caring for others there is an imperatival "must" which becomes part of our being. This "must" arises as an obligation through the recognition of the value of relatedness. An ethic of caring does not rest on rules, but rather upon faithfulness in caring as a genuine response to individual situations. An ethic of caring is not based upon the justification of moral judgments in contradistinction to the typical male oriented approach to ethics.

Further, an ethic of care is skeptical about institutions and institutionally directed actions regardless of the nature of the institutions under consideration whether religious, political or welfare oriented. Institutions cannot be caring and institutions demand loyalty in a way, which is foreign to and contradictory to authentic caring. In an interesting sense Noddings' approach is Incarnational, demanding the interaction of flesh and blood persons.


PART 4: NODDINGS HOPE FOR MALES

According to Noddings men and women view ethics very differently. Men tend to view ethics in detached terms, relying upon principles and rational analysis whereas women tend to view ethics in terms of concrete situations, the details of what is happening in those individual situations and in the context of a need for caring. Noddings strongly advocates a basically feminine approach to ethics. However, she does not claim that men are incapable of embracing a caring ethic. At this point she is surprisingly though not overly optimistic. She advocates a dialogue regarding masculine and feminine approaches to ethical decision-making and she argues that while women seem to have a greater innate tendency toward natural caring, men are not closed off from becoming more caring persons.


PART 5: EVALUATION OF NODDINGS ETHIC OF CARE APPROACH

Some critics of Noddings ethical approach point to the sharp dichotomy between masculine and feminine approaches to ethics in her theory. Noddings makes qualifications accepting some use of reason within a caring approach and she calls for an ethical dialogue in order to arrive at a transcendence of specifically masculine and feminine tendencies and yet this is overlooked or ignored in her theory.

A strength of Noddings' theory lies in her emphasis upon caring, which is missing from much traditional male oriented ethical theory. It is this writer's conclusion that she is correct that there is a need for a more engaged compassion and empathy on the part of the one caring as opposed to the more detached, rationalistic traditional approach.

ETHICS

Significant Texts for the following material include:

The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy (5th ed), ed. James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, ISBN: 978-0-07-340740-1 (required)

The Elements of Moral Philosophy (6th ed.), by James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, ISBN: 978-0-07-338671-3 (required)

Part 1 Introduction to Ethics: Baby Theresa

Theresa Ann Campo Pearson was born in Florida in 1992. She suffered from anencephaly, the condition of an infant born with its cerebrum, cerebellum and part of its skull and scalp missing Infants born with this condition have no possibility of conscious experience and nearly always die within several days after birth. Anencephaly occurs in one in 500 pregnancies. Over 95% identified prenatally are aborted. Of those carried to term, 60 percent are still born. Most anencephalics die within one week though in rare cases some have lived for one year.

He parents wanted to donate her organs to other infants. Their physician agreed. For this to work, they could not wait for her to die naturally. By that time her organs would be too degraded to be transplanted into other bodies. However, removing her organs would cause immediate death, and Florida law prohibits removing organs until the organ donor is legally dead. A circuit court judge determined that even though Theresa was anencephalic, she was not legally dead. So Theresa's organs were not removed. She died on the ninth day after she was born and her organs were never used.

There was a serious difference of opinion in this case. Some individuals such as Theresa's parents and physicians, thought that it would be morally good to take the organs, but others including some philosophers and ethicists thought that it would be bad.

But we do not want to know simply what people's opinions are about the case. We want to know the truth of the matter. The basic question is, "Would taking those organs, and thereby killing Baby Theresa, have been morally right, morally wrong, or neither?" In order to discover which position is correct, we should look at the reasons given by each side.

Side 1
• If we can benefit someone without harming anyone else, we ought to do so.
• Transplanting the organs would benefit the other children without harming Baby Theresa.
• Therefore, we ought to transplant the organs.

Side 2
• It is wrong to kill one person to save another.
• Taking Theresa's organs would be killing her to save others.
• So taking the organs would be wrong.

Question: Which of the reasons is better?


Part 2 Ethical Inquiry

Ethics is a branch of philosophy. The word "philosophy" derives from the Greek words for "love" and "wisdom." For the ancient Greeks, "philosophy" was love of wisdom. But while this might give us the beginning of an idea of what philosophers do today, we need to be more specific in order to really understand what contemporary philosophy is. Essentially, philosophy today is an area of inquiry. It is an attempt to discover truths about the world. IN this way, philosophy is like the sciences, historical research, investigative journalism and detective work. But philosophy is different than these other areas of inquiry in that the truths philosophy attempts to discover involve concepts that are more fundamental than those pursued by others of inquiry. Philosophy is concerned with concepts such as God, knowledge, truth, the mind and consciousness, freewill and right and wrong. Philosophy is inquiry into some of the most fundamental issues that face human beings.

Specifically, philosophy concerns itself with questions such as:

Is there a God? If so, what is he or she or it like? Is the existence of evil compatible with the existence of an all-caring, all knowing, all-powerful God? Is belief in the existence of a personal God compatible with belief in evolution?
Is the omniscience or all knowingness of God compatible with peoples' free will? Do people have free will to begin with?
What is the mind and what is the relationship between the mind and the brain?
What is knowledge and do we know anything to begin with? Are there things about the world that humans are inherently incapable of knowing?

Finally,

What is it for an action or behavior to be morally good or bad? What is the morally best way for people to live? Does morality depend on God? Does it depend on society? Is abortion morally permissible? Human cloning? Homosexuality? Are there objective moral facts, or is morality simply a matter of opinion?

These questions are within the field of ethics. Ethics is the area of philosophy that attempts to answer questions involving concepts such as right or wrong, good or bad, moral or immoral. Because ethics is an area of philosophy it is an area of inquiry that meant that it is a search for truth. It is not just an examination of what people think or feel about moral questions. It is an attempt to arrive at true answers to those questions.

Part 3 Ethics and Logic

Ethics is not a matter of simply saying what you believe or feel about a given issue. At least it shouldn't be. Philosophy/Ethics does not depend on specific sorts of empirical observation, gathering data, performing experiments or making calculations. However, philosophers do not simply announce their theories to the world without any evidence to back them up. Philosophy, including the sub discipline of ethics, depends on reasoning and evidence. Philosophers test existing theories and develop new ones, primarily by reasoning. They give arguments in support of their claims. An argument is a set of statements some of which, the argument's premises, are intended to serve as evidence or reason for thinking that another statement, the argument's conclusion, is true. A philosophical theory and an ethical theory is only as good as the arguments that we can give to support it. Because of this, most philosophical work consists in arguing in support of philosophical claims. In ethics, if you have a belief about what is morally right and what is morally wrong, you need to be able to back up that belief with good reasons. You need to be able to provide reasons for thinking that your belief is true. In short, you have to be able to give an argument for your belief.

Imagine for a moment that you say, "In general, theft is immoral." If I ask you why you think this to be the case, then you ought to be able to give me a reason. For example, "It harms the person from whom something is being stolen." This may be a good argument in support of the claim that, in general, theft is wrong. On the other hand an inadequate argument might be something like, "Sometimes you end up stealing low quality goods and it's really not worth the effort." If you can give no reason for asserting that theft is wrong, then i am within my rights to ignore you. This illustrates that morality is, or at least ought to be, based on reason.

Part 4 Back to Baby Theresa

Previously we cited two arguments about Baby Theresa. These arguments are form the book entitled Elements of Moral Philosophy. One argument may be termed "The Benefits Argument." It says:

1. If we can benefit someone without harming someone else, we ought to do so.
2. Transplanting the organs could benefit the other children without harming Baby Theresa.
3. Therefore we ought to transplant the organs.

The competing argument may be termed, "The Wrongness of Killing Argument." It says:

1. It is wrong to kill one person to save another.
2. Taking Theresa's organs would be killing her to save others.
3. So taking the organs would be wrong.

In the work, Elements of Moral Philosophy, the author makes an important point about the Baby Theresa case as well as others similar to it. He writes:

The case of Baby Theresa . . . like many others discussed in this book, are liable to arouse strong feelings. Such feelings are often a sign of moral seriousness and so may be admired. But they can also get in the way of discovering the truth. When we feel strongly about an issue, it is tempting to assume that we must "know" what the truth must be, without even having to consider the arguments on the other side. Unfortunately, however, we cannot rely on our feelings, no matter how powerful they may be. Our feelings may be irrational; they may be nothing but the products of prejudice, selfishness, or cultural conditioning. (At one time, for example, people's feelings told them that members of other races were inferior and that slavery was God's plan.) Moreover, different people's feelings often tell them opposite things. In the case of Tracy Latimer (cited in the book) some people feel very strongly that her father should have been given a long prison term, whereas others feel equally strong that he should never have been prosecuted. But both of these feelings cannot be correct. (Elements of Moral Philosophy, 11)

The fact is that sometimes people disagree about what is morally right and because it is usually possible to give arguments for each side of a moral issue, we must be able to evaluate moral arguments. In other words, we must be able to tell good arguments about morality from bad ones.

Part 5 A Little Logic - Validity

Consider the following argument:

1. All mammals are animals. (Premise 1)
2. All dogs are mammals. (Premise 2)
3. Therefore all dogs are animals. (Conclusion)

Notice a couple of things about these types of arguments. First of all, the form of the argument as presented to you in a reading for example will not necessarily be the same as the form above. In short, it will not be as formally blatant. For example, it may simply be part of the prose of the paragraph of material that you are reading. Second, notice the word "therefore." The word is highly significant in that it indicates the conclusion, which is to be supported by, and arrived at via the premises of the argument. In the above stated argument we have premise 1, premise 2, and conclusion. The conclusion is said to "follow from" the premises. If the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true. This idea is known as "validity." A valid argument is one in which:

1. if the premises were true, then the conclusion would have to be true as well.
2. the truth of the premises would guarantee the truth of the conclusion.
3. it is impossible for the premises to be all true and the conclusion to be false at the same time.

These three things are three equivalent ways of defining validity. However, you should recognize that to say, "the conclusions follows from the premises is NOT an adequate definition of validity. In light of this I should point out that in logic and philosophy the word "valid" does not mean exactly the same thing that it does in ordinary English. "Valid" means only "if the premises were true, then the conclusion would have to be true, as well. This is significant since some valid arguments have false premises.

Part 6 A Little More Logic: Valid Arguments with False Premises

Let's look at another valid argument.

1. All US Presidents have been from Texas. (Premise)
2. G. W. Bush is a US President (Premise)
3. Therefore, G.W. Bush is from Texas. (Conclusion)

Notice that the initial premise of this argument is false. All US Presidents have NOT been from Texas. However, the argument still has a tight connection between the premises and the conclusion. In other words, the conclusion does follow from the premises. In this sense the argument is valid. When considering the issue of validity with regard to an argument, it does not matter whether all of the premises are actually true, some of the premises are actually true, or none of the premises are actually true. Rather than asking, "If the premises are actually true or false," but ask "if the premises were true, would the conclusion then have to be true as well?"

Part 7 A Little More Logic: Arguments that Are Not Valid

Now let's consider an invalid argument.

1. Atlanta is located in Georgia. (Premise 1, which is True)
2. The moon orbits the earth. (Premise 2 which is True)
3. Therefore, G.W. Bush is President. (Conclusion, which is also True)

Each of the statements is true. However, there is in fact no connection between the premises and the conclusion. These things really have nothing to do with one another at all.

Consider another invalid argument.

1. Some US Presidents are from Georgia (Premise 1 which is true)
2. G.W. Bush is a President (Premise 2 which is true)
3. Therefore, GW Bush is from Georgia (Conclusion which is false)

This is an invalid argument. It is one in which the truth of the premises would not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. The operative word in premise 1 is "Some". By virtue of this word, "Some", it is not guaranteed that G.W. Bush is from Georgia since only "some" US Presidents are from Georgia. He might be one of those from some other state or location. Notice in the above argument that while the premises are true, the conclusion is false.

Part 8 A Little More Logic: Soundness


When we critically evaluate an ethical argument we are asking two related but distinct questions. First, is the argument valid? This question concerns the logical aspect of the argument. Second, we ask if all of the premises of the argument are true. This question concerns the factual or material dimensions of the argument. If the answer to both of these questions is "yes" then the argument is said to be "sound." As pertaining to an argument, "soundness" consists of an argument being valid and having true premises. But if the answer to either of the two questions cited above is "no", then the argument is not sound and we should reject it. The fact that an argument is not sound does not mean that its conclusion is false. Showing that an argument is bad is very different than showing that the conclusion of the argument is false. Al that can be concluded from the fact that an argument is unsound is that the conclusion has not been proven true by that argument and a different argument is needed to support this conclusion. There are some arguments that are good in their logical aspect, even though they are not valid arguments.


Part 9 The Limited Cultural Differences Argument

Consider the following:

Different societies disagree about the morality of certain actions. For example, in traditional Eskimo society, infanticide or the killing of a newborn baby is believed to be morally permissible or not morally wrong under certain circumstances. In these circumstances it is left up to the parents to decide whether to kill the infant and there is no social stigma attached to the practice. Interestingly it is more common with baby girls than with boys. But in contemporary American society, killing an infant is believed to be morally wrong regardless of the circumstances. The argument regarding this issue has been proposed as follows:

1. In some societies infanticide is believed to be morally permissible.
2. In other societies, infanticide is believed to be morally wrong.
3. Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively permissible nor objectively wrong; there is no objective fact of the matter, only beliefs about whether or not it is morally wrong.


But in contemporary American society, killing an infant is believed to be morally wrong, no matter what the circumstances. (You will read more about this practice of the Eskimos in EMP 2.5).



Here is the argument that Rachels asks us to consider (argument #4 on RTD p.23). I will call it the Limited Cultural Differences Argument (LCDA) (I have changed it slightly to make it clearer; I have also given it a different name than it has in the textbook):


Question: Is this a valid argument? Does it have true premises?


Part 10 Argument and Objectivity

In he previously cited argument, the word "objective" is a central word. The word is a familiar one, but it is not the easiest term to define. In the previously cited argument, the word "objective" means something to the effect of independence of what anyone believes, thinks, or feels about it. For example, "it is objectively true that p" = "i is true that p whether or not anyone believes that p." It is objectively true that the earth orbits the sun, that 2+2=4, etc. A synonym for "objective" is real. In addition the phrase "about it' is also important. It is possible for something to depend on what someone thinks or feels or believes without depending on what anyone thinks or feels or believes about that think. For example, suppose that I dream that I win the lottery. It is objectively true that I dreamed about winning the lottery. I really did dream about that and whether or not I dreamed about the lottery depends on what I think, since dreaming is a form of thinking. But it doesn't depend on what I think about what I dreamed. I really did dream about the lottery, whether or not I think that I did. That I dreamed about the lottery is an objective fact about my mind. In general, any fact about my mental life depends on what i think, feel or believe; but any such fact does not depend on what i think, feel or believe about that fact. "Objective" is the opposite of "subjective." "Subjective" refers to when there is no truth or fact of the matter about it, only opinions, beliefs/feelings. For example, whether rancid goats milk is delicious is a subjective matter.

Part 11 Is the Limited Cultural Differences Argument a "Sound" Argument?

Remember that "sound," means 1) having all true premises and 2) valid. So we can divide the question into two parts. First, are both of the premises true and second is the argument valid. If the answer to either question is "no", then the argument is unsound and we should reject it.

Rachels contends that the premises of the Limited Cultural Difference Argument are both true. Each premise makes a factual psychological claim about what is believed by a specific group of people. The fact that these premises are about what people believe, he argues, does not make them subjective. For example, it is an objective fact about me that I believe that Austin is the capitol of Texas and it is an objective fact about most Americans that they believe that infanticide is immoral.

However, even though the premises are true, the conclusion is invalid. The truth of the premises does not guarantee the validity of the conclusion. The reason is that in general, the fact that different groups of people have contradictory beliefs about x does not imply that there are no objective truths about x. It is possible for two groups to have conflicting beliefs about a subject and for one of those groups to be right and the other to be wrong or for both groups to be wrong. But there is an important point to be made here. The fact that the Limited Cultural Differences Argument is unsound does not imply that its conclusion is false.

It just means that the argument itself is not a good argument for that conclusion. It may still be true that infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively wrong. We simply need a better argument to support the claim that infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively wrong.

Part 12 - Moral Skepticism and Moral Realism

The conclusion of the Limited Cultural Differences Argument expresses what is "moral skepticism" about infanticide. This argument is supposed to show that there is no truth of the matter about the morality of killing infants, that there is actually no objective right or wrong when it comes to infanticide The only relevant truths are truths about what people in different societies actually "believe".

Moral Skepticism may be defined as the view that there is no such thing as objective moral truth or that no moral judgments that are true or false for that matter independent of what people think, feel or believe about them. One may be a moral skeptic about all morality which one might call "full blown" moral skepticism or one may endorse "limited moral skepticism" for example about only a specific moral issue such as infanticide or abortion.

Moral Skepticism is the opposite of Moral Realism which may be defined as the view there is such a thing as objective moral truth or that there actually are moral judgments that are true or false independent of what people, think, feel or believe about them.

The Limited Cultural Differences Argument concludes that there is no objective truth as to whether infanticide is right or wrong. All that there is with regard to the issue of infanticide is opinion or belief. With regard to the issue of infanticide, for example, the Limited Cultural Differences Argument would support Moral Skepticism and oppose Moral Realism.

Part 13 The Provability Argument

The next argument that Rachels addresses is in support of "full blown moral skepticism. In other words, it is an argument in support of moral skepticism about everything, not just about a single issue such as infanticide, abortion or capital punishment. In The Right Thing To Do (RTD) Rachels proposes:

If there were ay such thing as objective truth in ethics, we should be able to prove that some moral opinions are true and others false.
But in fact we cannot prove which moral opinions are true and which are false.
Therefore, there is no such thing as objective truth in ethics.

But is this true? Is this a sound argument? The Provability Argument is actually "valid." It has the following argument form:

If p, then q.
Not q.
Therefore, not p.

The fact is that any argument that has this form is a valid argument. It does not matter what propositions you fill in for "p" and "q" as long as both "p's" are replaced with the same proposition and both "q's" are replaced with the same proposition, the resulting argument will be valid.

Consider the following:

If Atlanta is the capital of Georgia, then the moon is made of cheese.
The moon is not made of cheese.
Therefore, Atlanta is not the capital of Georgia.

This is actually a valid argument even though one of its premises is false and this argument form has been given the designation modus tollens.

However, according to Rachels' the Provability Argument is unsound because the second premise is false. His criticism is aimed at the factual aspect of the argument, not the logical aspect of the argument. He contends that we can actually prove moral claims to be true and he gives a number of examples of moral opinions that he thinks we can prove to be true.

That a test was unfair.
That "Jones is a bad man."
That "Dr. Smith is irresponsible."
That "A certain used car salesman is unethical."

In order for the Provability Argument to remain valid, the word "prove" must have the same meaning in both premises. If the meaning of the word changes from premise to premise 2 then the argument is invalid. However, the word "prove" is ambiguous. It can mean two different things.

On the one hand the word "proof" can refer to that proof which is so strong that it leaves no possibility of error. If this is the sort of proof the argument refers to, then the first premise is false. This form of proof is impossible no matter what area of inquiry we are talking about whether history, philosophy or the sciences. The fact that we cannot prove a claim to be true in this matter does not imply that the claim is neither objectively true nor objectively false. On the other hand the words "proof" can be used to speak of that which involves extremely strong evidence, but that still leaves room for the possibility of error. If this is the sort of proof the argument refers to then the second premise is false. It is possible to prove therefore in this sense that some ethical opinions are true, for example that a given test was unfair. Therefore, no matter how you interpret the argument, it turns out to have a false premise and is consequently an unsound argument.

The bottom line is that the proponent of Moral Skepticism needs a better argument.

Part 14 Moral Skepticism and Moral Cultural Relativism

Suppose that some actions are morally right and that other actions are morally wrong. If this is correct, then we are faced with the question, "What makes an action morally right or morally wrong?"

Different theories of morality answer this question in different ways. According to the next theory we will consider whether an action is morally right or morally wrong is determined by the beliefs and the attitudes that people have in the society within which the action is performed. This theory says that whatever behaviors are believed to be right or wrong by the members of a society are right or wrong within that society. In other words, morality is relative to culture. This is a very rough statement of the theory known as moral cultural relativism (MCR).

It is important to see an important connection between MCR and a theory we just examined, Moral Skepticism. Remember that according to Moral Skepticism there is no such thing as objective moral truth. The connection between MCR and Moral Skepticism may be summed up in the following manner: MCR implies moral skepticism. In other words, if morality really does depend on nothing but what people in a given society believe about morality, then there is no such thing as objective morality.

Part 15 Ethics: Is it all relative?

But what does it mean to say that one thing is relative to another?

It means that one thing "depends" on the other in some significant way.

For example, left and right are relative to direction. If you are driving east on I-10 then downtown Houston is on your right, but if you are driving west on I-10 then downtown Houston is on your left. Consequently the question of which side, right of left, is downtown Houston on when you are driving I-10 doesn't make sense since it is dependent upon which direction you are traveling. Moral Cultural Relativism says the same thing in relation to morality. Whether a given action is morally right or morally wrong is relative to the culture of one's society. Even more specifically, morality or right and wrong, is dependent upon what people in one's society believe about morality.

Sometimes MCR is referred to as "cultural relativism." However, you should know that the name "cultural relativism is used to refer to a number of different theories. Most of these theories claim that something is relative to or dependent upon one's culture or society. But not all of them refer specifically to morality. One approach claims that standards of evidence are relative to one's society. Another theory claims that all truths and not just moral theory but historical theory and scientific theory for example are relative to one's culture. When you hear someone refer simply to cultural relativism you should ask exactly what theory do you mean? What does the theory say is relative to culture?

Part 16 Moral Cultural Relativism and Polygamy: An Example

Consider for example the issue of Moral Cultural Relativism and Polygamy. Polygamy may be defined as having more than one spouse or mate at a time. More often than not polygamy involves one man having multiple wives. Polygamy is thought to be morally permissible in some societies and in some segments of American society; however, it is thought to be wrong in others. It is estimated that between 20,000 and 100,000 people in the United States engage in polygamy.

According to Moral Cultural Relativism, there is no truth of the matter about whether polygamy is right or wrong universally just as there is no truth of the matter about whether or not the city of Houston is on the left or right of I-10. According to Moral Cultural Relativism whether polygamy is right or wrong depends on the societal context. In some societies, it is morally permissible but in others it is morally impermissible.

Part 17 The Claims of Moral Cultural Relativism

Based upon what we have said so far, Moral Cultural Relativism is an ethical theory that consists of a group of separate claims:

1. Different societies have different moral codes or different collective beliefs about morality.
2. The moral code of a society determines what is right within that society; that is if the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action is right at least within that society.
3. There is no objective standard that can be used to judge one society's code better than another's. There are no moral truths that hold for all people at all times. This is another way of advancing "full blown" moral skepticism. Moral Cultural Relativism includes full-blown Moral Skepticism as one of its claims.
4. The moral code of our own society has no special status but is merely one moral code among many.
5. It is arrogant for us to judge other cultures. We should always be tolerant of them.

Part 18 - Moral Cultural Relativism and Rape: An Example

Consider the following passage from the book Infidel by former Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Alai:

I found it remarkable how many esteemed Muslim thinkers had philosophized at such length about precisely how much female skin could be bared without causing chaos to break out across the landscape. Of course, almost all these thinkers agreed that once a girl reaches puberty, every part of her body except her face and her hands must be covered when in the company of any men who are not immediate family, and at all times outside the home. This was because her bare skin would involuntarily cause men to feel an uncontrollable frenzy of sexual arousal. But not all thinkers agreed on exactly which part of a woman's face and hands were so beguiling that they must be covered.

Some scholars held that the eyes of women were the strongest source of sexual provocation: when the Quran said women should lower their gaze it actually meant they should hide their eyes. Another school of thought held that the very sight of a woman's lips, especially full ones that were firm and young, could bring a man into a sexual state that could cause his downfall. Yet other thinkers spent pages and pages on the sensual curve of the chin, a pretty nose, or long, slender fingers and the tendency of some women to move their hands in a way that attracted attention to their temptations. For every limitation the Prophet was quoted.

Even when the entire woman had been covered completely from head to toe, another line of thought was opened. For this was not enough. High heels tapped and could trigger in men the image of woman's legs; to avoid sin, women must wear flat shoes that make no noise. Next came perfume; using any kind of pleasant fragrance, even perfumed soap and shampoo, would district the minds of men or Allah's worship and cause them to fantasize about sinning. The safest way to cause no harm to anyone seemed to avoid contact with any man at all times and just stay in the houses. A man's sinful erotic thoughts were always the fault of the woman who incited them.

Interestingly Bruce Bawer comments:

. . . in September . . . , the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet, reported that 65 percent of rapes of Norwegian women were performed by "non-western" immigrants - a category that, in Norway, consists mostly of Muslims. The article quoted a professor of social anthropology at the University of Oslo (who was described as having "lived for many years in Muslim countries") as saying that "Norwegian women must take their share of responsibility for these rapes" because Muslim men found their manner of dress provocative. One reason for the high number of rapes by Muslims, explained the professor, was that in their native countries "rape is scarcely punished," since Muslims "believe that it is women who are responsible for rape." The professor's conclusion was not that Muslim men living in the West needed to adjust to Western norms, but exact opposite: "Norwegian women must realize that we live in a multicultural society and adapt themselves to it." (Bruce Bawer "Tolerating Intolerance: The Challenge of Fundamentalist Islam in Western Europe," Partisan Review LXIX (3) 2002)

Now let's apply the emphasis of Moral Cultural Relativism to the issue of rape as described in the passages above. Someone who accepts all five claims of Moral Cultural Relativism might say the following: there is no objective fact of the matter regarding whether rape is the moral responsibility of the rapist or the victim - no truth about the morality of rape that applies universally, to all societies. In some societies, such as ours, it is viewed as morally wrong to rape someone, but in other societies, it is thought the rape victim who is blamed. Neither approach is objectively better or worse (according to Moral Cultural Relativism) than the other. We believe one thing. They believe another. This is all there is to be said about the subject.

Part 19 The Generalized Cultural Differences Argument

Many defenders of Moral Cultural Relativism propose the Generalized Cultural Differences Argument as their defense. They propose:

1. Different cultures have different moral codes.
2. Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.

Notice that the above stated argument has a single premise and there is nothing wrong with this logic. An argument can have any number of premises whatsoever, not just two. This is san argument only for the first part of claim (3) of Moral Cultural Relativism that is an argument for full-blown moral skepticism. This argument uses the same reasoning as the Limited Cultural Differences Argument that we addressed previously, but this particular argument applies to every moral issue and not just one. This is an important distinction.

The question at this point however is, "Is the Generalized Cultural Differences Argument" a sound argument or "is its premise true and is it valid? Consequently, the General Cultural Differences Argument is unsound because it is invalid. The problem with the argument is that the claim that people disagree about which practices are moral or immoral does not, by itself, show that there is no such thing as objective moral truth. It is possible for two groups of people to disagree about something even tough there are objective facts about that particular something. This does not mean that the argument's conclusion (full blown moral skepticism) is false. Again, from the fact that an argument is unsound, you cannot tell whether its conclusion is false. In other words, the General Cultural Differences Argument may be a bad argument for a true claim. So even though the premise of the General Cultural Differences Argument is true (Different societies really do have different moral codes), it is still an unsound argument.

Part 20 Arguments against Moral Cultural Relativism: the Moral Inferiority Argument

The Moral Inferiority Argument has the following logical structure:

If p, then q
Not q.
Therefore not p.

We can substitute for p and q:

If Busy is President, then the President is male.
The President is not male.
Therefore, Bush is not the President.

This is a modus tollens argument in which p = Bush is President" and q = "the President is male." It does not matter that the second premise is false; the argument is still valid because it has the form shown above.

You will notice that this is the same logical form or structure as the Provability Argument. Remember that any argument with this logical structure is valid.

Part 21 Arguments against Moral Cultural Relativism: The Moral Consultation Argument

The Moral Consultation Argument consists of the following points:

1 If Moral Cultural Relativism is true, then we can discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standards of our society.
2. But we cannot discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standard of our society.
3. Therefore, Moral Cultural Relativism is not true.

Part 22 Arguments against Moral Cultural Relativism: The Moral Improvement Argument

The Moral Improvement argument consists of the following points;

1. If Moral Cultural Relativism is true, then a society cannot become morally better than it was before.
2. But a society can become morally better than it was before.
3. Therefore, Moral Cultural Relativism is not true.

Part 23: Evaluating the Arguments: The First Premise of Each Argument

Each of the three arguments presented above begins by stating a consequence of Moral Cultural Relativism. In other words, each of the first premises simply states that if Moral Cultural Relativism is true, then there is a consequence of the theory that is also true. For example:

Moral Inferiority: If MCR is true, then no customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own.

Moral Consultation: If MCR is true, then we can discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standards of our society.

Moral Improvement: If MCR is true, then a society cannot become morally better than it was before.

Part 24 Evaluating the Arguments: The Second Premise of Each Argument

A more challenging question centers upon the second premise of each of the arguments. Is the second premise of each argument true?

Moral Inferiority: Some customs of others societies (e.g. slavery, anti Semitism) are morally inferior to our own.

Moral Consultation: We cannot discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standards of our society.

Moral Improvement: A society can become morally better than it was before.

The reality is that the defender of Moral Cultural Relativism must reject the second premise of each of these arguments and accept three unpleasant consequences of Moral Cultural Relativism. Consider the Moral Inferiority Argument. A defender of Moral Cultural Relativism must say that premise (2) is false. She must say that, in fact slavery in contemporary Africa and the Middle East is morally no worse than the rejection of slavery in contemporary Europe and America. Forcing people into slavery and not forcing them into slavery are morally equivalent. The defender of Moral Cultural Relativism against the Moral Consultation Argument must take the same sort of approach. We must say that premise (2) of the argument is false and accept the consequence that a person such as Dr. Martin Luther King really can tell whether an action is morally right or wrong in his or her society simply by examining what is believed to be right and wrong in that that society.

The defender of Moral Cultural Relativism must also claim that premise (2) of the Moral Improvement Argument is false since she must claim that today's America is morally no better than the America of 150 years ago and that today's Germany is no better than Nazi German, etc.

Part 25 Evaluating the Arguments.

Rachels contends that Moral Cultural Relativism is false but he also believes that we can learn some lessons from our study of Moral Cultural Relativism. The lessons are as follows:

1. Not everything we take to be objectively moral or immoral is objectively moral or immoral. For example, at least some of our cultural practices are peculiar to our society and are ultimately no morally better or worse than different practices sin other societies, such as funerary practices since the Greeks burned their dead bodies, while the Callatians ate their and we either cremate or bury our own. Monogamous relationships rather than polyamory or having more than one partner with the consent of everyone involved and the bearing of female breasts in public as in the case of the Janet Jackson Super Bowl fiasco of 2004.
However there is one caveat or warning or explanation, which is required to prevent misinterpretation. The fact that some of our cultural practices are neither objectively moral not objectively immoral does not imply that none of them are. Moral Cultural Relativism goes to far in saying that ALL of our practices are mere cultural products, neither objectively moral nor objectively immoral.

2. Our moral beliefs are not necessarily "perceptions of the truth". Many of them result from cultural conditioning or inculcation rather than from unbiased examinations of the evidence and may well be wrong. Through out our lives we develop some very strong feelings about morality. This can cause us to be very resistant to the suggestion that our moral views are incorrect. Rachels cites as an example of this the issue of homosexuality and the contention of its immorality or even "evilness". Rachels contends that this is not our conclusion because we have engaged in a rational consideration of the reasons for and against thinking this, but because this has been the prevalent view of many people in our society and we simply absorbed this view as we grew up. Many of us have strong feelings about this and we can be resistant when someone suggests that our feelings are misguided. But we can overcome this resistance by remember, as MCR points out, that many of those views are the result of inculcation or the process of teaching or impressing by urging or frequent repetition and not of rational consideration.

But once again the there is a caveat to be retained. The fact that many of our moral beliefs result from cultural conditioning rather than rational consideration does not imply that none of those beliefs are objectively true. Moral Cultural Relativism does go too far when it advances that ALL moral beliefs are merely cultural prejudices that do not reflect any moral truths.

HAPPINESS AND RIGHT ACTION

Part 1 Happiness and Right Action

We have been discussing what makes something right or wrong and we have explored two particular approaches to the issue: Cognitivism and Non Cognitivism. In addition, we have considered God as the basis for morality. Our conclusion was that right and wrong are independent of God; however, God is the respecter of right and wrong. In short, we concluded that things are right or wrong in themselves and need no external vantage point. But there is a further question regarding the reason for determining that stealing is wrong. Why do we say that adultery or stealing or lying is wrong? What is it exactly that makes these things wrong for example. This leads us to a consideration of the relationship of morality and happiness. The two are not independent of each other. It should be pointed out that at this point in our discussion we are moving toward what has been termed a "Consequentialist" understanding of right and wrong.


Part 2 Utilitarianism and Jeremy Bentham

The close connection between morality and happiness of which we are speaking is called Utilitarianism, a movement founded essentially by Jeremy Bentham. According to Utilitarianism an action is right or wrong based on the consequences of that action or based upon "well being." When asked whether an action is right or wrong, we are really asking how would a particular course of action contribute to the well being of an individual or of a people. For example, we may ask why is stealing wrong? The answer is because if someone steals your stuff this makes you unhappy. More precisely, Utilitarianism argues that the right course of action for an individual in the midst of an ethical dilemma is that which will produce the greatest good for the greatest amount of people. An action is bad when it fails to assure the greatest good for the greatest amount of people.


Part 3 Problems with Utilitarianism

The theory itself sounds very sensible and has been absorbed into our thinking as a culture and is increasingly being thrust upon us as a political society. However it should be pointed out that Utilitarianism was and still is a very radical notion for a number of reasons. First, the theory is a rejection of other ideas as the basis for right or wrong action, such as the bible. In the past, individuals cited the biblical material for example as a basis for authoritatively determining which is the most appropriate course of action to take. However, Utilitarianism essentially leads to the rejection of the biblical material in this capacity. Utilitarianism also constitutes a rejection of certain of the laws of a society. We may ask, "What are the customs of our society" in answer to which course of action is the most appropriate or right. But Utilitarianism rejects this criterion in favor of happiness. A given law or custom may produce less happiness than another policy or course of action and is therefore deemed to be wrong. In this sense, Utilitarianism is a universalistic doctrine in that no matter where one resides or what the customs of a culture or society may be, it is universally applied. In addition, Utilitarianism also rejects our concern for motives in moral decision-making. For example, an evil motive or a virtuous motive is rejected as of little or no concern since what matters is not motive but the consequences of one's moral decision. In short, Utilitarianism is only concerned with the effects of an action or the consequences of an action. The theory sounds like common sense, but in fact it is a very radical notion and involves the rejection of many of our standard views of morality. In short, Utilitarianism is a potentially very revolutionary ethical doctrine.


Part 4 Utilitarianism: Individual and Social

Bentham directed Utilitarianism on two levels: individually ad socially. He was concerned at the policy level with what the individual should do, as well as what society should do.

Utilitarianism is an egalitarian movement. It is concerned with producing the most happiness for the most people and is not concerned at all with who possess the happiness or pleasure or benefit. There is no privileged section of society, which deserves happiness more than others according to the Utilitarian perspective. Happiness is not to be limited to the view at the expense of the majority. In addition, Utilitarianism is also a democratic theory. It especially lends itself to the democratic context. In this sense it is very anti monarchial. Utilitarianism, as such, is a progressive perspective that is not the least concerned with holding onto the status quo or the elitist perspectives.


Part 5 Utilitarianism and Taxation

As previously stated, Utilitarianism has a political dimension. We could apply the perspective for instance to the topic of taxation. How should taxation be determined in a society? We night decide taxation based upon those who do the most work. For instance, those who do the most work would be taxed at a lower level or at a higher level than others. Utilitarianism says that we should tax only according to the principle of greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. It would call for the redistribution of taxable income. Happiness, therefore, should be distributed equally among the masses.

Again, Utilitarianism sounds like a very common sense approach. However, as previously stated, it is not without its problems. There is something missing in Utilitarian theory. It simply does not give the entire picture and omits major aspects of our usual view of morality. Utilitarianism rejects the issues of motive or character. The fact is that we often evaluate people's motives and not just the consequences of their actions. We look at the kind of person an individual is and the kind of motives they act from. However Utilitarian would say that this is not relevant. An evil person for example can produce good results and a good person can produce evil results. In addition, Utilitarianism has no concern for moral rules. Rules are always subject to revision or to abandonment. Utilitarianism therefore argues that we should look at the consequences and not the rules. In addition, rights are of no concern for the Utilitarian since the theory is concerned exclusively with consequences. But this exclusive concern for consequences or outcome focused upon producing happiness is problematic since what counts as happiness to one individual is not necessarily happiness to another. How do we compare happiness? How do I compare your happiness to mind? Is there such a thing as a unit of happiness? What would a unit of happiness be like? So there is something incomplete about Utilitarian theory.


Part 6 Utilitarianism and Slavery

Consider the topic of slavery for example in relationship to Utilitarian theory. Some individuals would reject slavery on the basis that it is a violation of certain human rights. Utilitarian are not concerned however in this fashion. Remember that Utilitarianism is concerned only with numbers, specifically producing the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Interestingly, Utilitarian were anti slavery because it was a matter of numbers and not of rights.


Part 7 Utilitarianism and Animal Rights

Consider the topic of animal rights in relationship to Utilitarianism. In recent years animals rights has become a major concern. Peter Singer utilizes Utilitarian arguments in addressing the issue of animal rights, arguing that our treatment of animals is immoral. He contends that we derive pleasure from animals by eating, wearing, sporting and through entertainment but the unfortunate consequence is the immense amount of unhappiness and cruelty toward animals which makes such uses wrong. He points out that factory farms, slaughter houses, circus animals, cosmetics research causes untold amounts of suffering in the non human animal population. Therefore, based upon these negative consequences it is wrong to abuse or even possess animals.


Part 8 Utilitarianism, Globalism and Economics

Consider also the relationship between the first world and the third world. According to Singer we maintain a high standard of existence in the first world at the expense of untold suffering, pain and agony in the third world. In short, we are causing a great amount of suffering for our own benefit. We could better utilize our resources or material possessions in an effort at producing a greater amount of happiness in third world countries.

Utilitarianism leads to some very disturbing consequences. The theory sounds like a sensible one but it is actually questionable in that it reduces the standard for moral decision making to one single criterion - producing the greatest good for the greatest number of people with no regard to customs, laws, rights or motives.


Part 9 Utilitarianism: The Downside

Again, Utilitarianism does not always work as we would like. On the face it seems right and yet as a theory it does not make room for things such as justice. Again, the theory is only concerned with consequences. For example, consider ten wicked men and one virtuous man. Consider further if we torture the innocent man we will derive for the wicked men a great deal of happiness since the innocent man knows where to find a million dollars for instance. Consequently, after torturing the innocent man and after he yields the information the ten wicked men retrieve the money and live happily. The question emerges, "Should we torture the innocent man?" The answer is plainly, "No." But Utilitarianism comes along and says, "Don't be so hasty in your conclusion. He will indeed suffer but the other men will get more happiness than the suffering endured by this one man." However, this conclusion on the part of the Utilitarian seems more than wrong. It is indeed evil. The innocent man's rights are violated and the ten wicked men who do not deserve the money benefit from retrieving the information and the money. Utilitarianism causes us to "brutalize" other moral considerations and so as a moral theory it is overly monolithic. Happiness should be part and only part of an individuals or a societies moral code. We need to consider other variables as well. This same concept could be applied in the contemporary debate concerning the use of torture in an effort to prevent terrorism. That particular situation is a terribly tragic one, but nonetheless, relevant to the debate concerning Utilitarianisms legitimacy. In short, there sees to be no simplistic approach to these types of moral dilemma's, including the overly simplistic theory of Utilitarianism.

ETHICS AND MORALITY

Part 1 What is the nature of ethical knowledge?

Is ethical knowledge or knowledge or "right" and "wrong" aposteriori knowledge or apriori knowledge? We use the terms "right" and "good" or "moral" and "immoral" frequently. By our use of those words we are referring to behavior that is either to be pursued or to be rejected. But the question emerges from our consideration of the ethical as to exactly what the nature of ethical knowledge is. Again, we are not asking what is right or wrong but how do we determine what the essential nature "rightness" or "wrongness" is. Is ethical knowledge derived from experience or aposteriori knowledge or is ethical knowledge innate or apriori knowledge? It seems that it is not as though I can see in the act of stealing, for example, the wrongness of the act. Therefore, the moral quality of an action is not found in the sensory character of an action. Consequently, it appears that ethical knowledge is more similar to apriori knowledge or non-sensory knowledge. However, it should also be stated that there seems to be a unique character to ethical knowledge. In this sense ethical knowledge is a very puzzling knowledge.


Part 2 J. L. Mackie and Ethical Knowledge

There are those such as J. L. Mackie who argued that ethical knowledge is to be considered "non natural" or not natural knowledge. Mackie contended that ethical statements are "queer" or "odd" or "peculiar" statements. Therefore ethical statements should be questioned. For instance, what is goodness? Is "goodness" a property at all? Why do we have to suppose that there are moral facts or moral truths at all? He argued that maybe we shouldn't think of moral statements in this fashion at all. Previously we argued that "truth" should be determined by what is termed "correspondence theory." That is, truth corresponds to something in the external world. But how can correspondence theory be applied to ethical truth or ethical knowledge? For example if truth is determined by correspondence to the external world, to what in the external world does ethical truth correspond? What kind of external state of affairs is it? Where is the correspondence between ethical facts and the external world? Determining this is truly problematic.

This position has led to a view, which attempts to side step the issue of correspondence theory in relation to ethical knowledge. The theory is called Non factualism or Ethical Emotivism. It proposes that ethical statements do not express facts at all. But what do they do? Emotivism argues that ethical statements or utterances are nothing more than the expression of emotions. The theory of ethical Emotivism was advocated by the logical positivists. It is also called the "Boo/Hurrah" ethical theory. According to this viewpoint, ethical statements are nothing more than disguised nonsense and correspond to nothing external. When I see someone steal I say, "Boo" or "that's terrible." It is the expression of an emotion of disapproval. M speech act expresses that emotion. "Boo" does not express an actual fact according to this theory. There are mo moral properties or truths in ethical Emotivism. Ethics is to be equated with a feeling or a desire.

What is the advantage of this theory of ethical knowledge? First it avoids the search for moral "facts." It deals with moral language. Second, ethical Emotivism also gives a more accurate account of the reality of moral statements. Ethical Emotivism does acknowledge that emotions play a part in moral statements, though perhaps it goes to far in this. But positively speaking, ethical Emotivism affirms that morality is truly about emotions and that this is an escapable component of ethical talk.

On the other hand there is "Cognitivism" which stands in contradistinction to "Non Cognitivism" of which ethical Emotivism is a type. Cognitivism argues that there is actually something factual to be considered at the heart of a moral statement or the claim to moral knowledge.

In addition, there is descriptivism and prescriptivism. Descriptive ethical statements are those, which simply describe a moral state of affairs. Prescriptivism on the other hand says that moral language prescribes or orders a moral course of action. For example, to say, "Stealing is wrong" is the same as to say, "Don't steal." In other words we are determining an "ought" from an "is." When I say something is wrong, I am therefore according to prescriptivism implying that I ought not to do it and conversely with regard to that which is right.


Part 3 Moral Statements as Imperatives

Consider for example the statement, "Love thy neighbor." This Christian ethical mandate is stated in the imperatival form. It is a command. This has been seized on by the non-Cognitivist as saying that this proves that moral statements are covert imperatives. However, the opposing view or the Cognitivist view, contends that moral inquiry is the same as any other inquiry. When we make a moral statement, we are simply trying to find out the facts as we do with such disciplines as mathematics, psychology, or physics. We are thinking an issue through and arriving at what we thick the moral truth is or what the moral facts are. In this sense ethical statements and ethical knowledge takes on a metaphysical dimension it seems. For example, suppose I say, "Abortion is wrong in the seventh month of pregnancy." Cognitivists propose that I investigate the issue, think the issue through and then reach this conclusion.


Part 4 Cognitivism and Moral Realism

Cognitivism or Moral Realism contends that I do not investigate a moral question with my senses. In this sense ethical knowledge is apriori. I am to think my way through the ethical dilemma with which I am confronted. But the question is by what faculty do I come to know ethical facts and possess ethical knowledge? Bertrand Russell argues in his work "Problems in Philosophy" that ethical knowledge is a type of apriori knowledge. I other words, when I know that murder is wrong, I have apriori knowledge that murder is wrong as with a mathematical formula such as 2+2=4. This is the same type of knowledge as analytic knowledge. Ethics then becomes as solid as mathematics and consequently there is nothing dubious about ethical knowledge.
Bertrand Russell in problems of philosophy book apriori knowledge is a type of apriori knowledge.


Part 5 Evaluating Cognitivism and Non Cognitivism

Non-cognitivism leads to moral relativism. If all there is emotion is moral discourse, then morality may vary from individual to individual or from context to context. Murder may be wrong in one context according to one individual, but murder is right in a different context according to different individuals. Cognitivist view moral facts as actual moral facts on the other hand and there are therefore no danger of relativism. Emotivist or Non Cognitivist would argue that murder is wrong simply because of a bad emotion or desire, which we have about murder. Cognitivist would argue on the other hand that murder is wrong based on the reality of it.


Part 6 Ethics and God

Many believe that morality is only binding if God is behind it. However is this actually true. If God is the foundation according to some individuals then we can avoid moral relativism. Indeed some would argue that this is the only way to avoid moral relativism. In short, God is indispensable to morality. For example, what makes stealing wrong? These would say that stealing is wrong because God says it is wrong. This is a very tempting idea but the question exists as to whether this is a legitimate deduction or not. Socrates himself in Plato's Dialogue entitled Euthyphro refuted it. In the work Socrates is wandering around Athens and he is discussing with his interlocutors how to define the good and the holy. Euthyphro contends that he has the answer. The holy and the good is what the gods love while the bad is what the gods deplored or hate. It is a very simple idea. It is summed up on Christian terminology in divine command theory. God commands an action that makes that action right. God prohibits an action, which makes that action wrong. Socrates then asks Euthyphro as to whether he thinks something is actually wrong because the gods decree that it is wrong to which Euthyphro responds in the affirmative. Socrates then points out the problem with the conclusion. If right is right because the God say that it is right then right and wrong are arbitrary. Consequently, the gods could have decreed otherwise and we could have lived in a sort of topsy-turvy world, although it would not be actually topsy-turvy since we would not know otherwise. The question centers upon the following dilemma: is something wrong because the gods say it is wrong or do the gods decree something as wrong because it is wrong in and of itself? Socrates is saying that we surely do not want morality to be arbitrary or to depend upon God's stipulation. In Socrates conclusion, God is not the basis of morality but God is the one who respects morality. It is an interesting observation. The important consequence of this reality lies in the proposition that even if there is no god, therefore it does not detract from morality. Even if there is no god then morality stands. To lose God is not to lose morality. God is not the foundation for moral beliefs. This addresses the issue that people worry about. Even if there is a God, on the other hand, he is not the basis for morality.