26.10.08
Metaphysics: Locke (1632-1704)
A consequence of the new "mathematicized" metaphysics of Descartes was that a certain gap opened up between the quantitative description of the world put forward by the scientists and the common sense world revealed by the five senses - the world of colors, smells, tastes, sounds, and textures.
Descartes had point out that nothing reaches the brain from the outside world except various "local motions" transmitted through the sense organs. He concluded that the properties in external objects to which we apply the terms "light", "color", smell", "taste", "sound", "heat", and cold" are, so far as we can see, simply various dispositions in the shapes, sizes, positions, and movements of their parts that make them able to set up various kinds of motions in our nerves, which then produce all the various sensations in our soul.
Taking up this theme, the English philosopher John Lock made a radical distinction between primary and secondary qualities of things. Primary qualities such as shape, he argues are utterly inseparable from the body or the object being observed in whatsoever state it is. Descartes took being extended in three dimensions as the essential characteristic of matter.
Locke's list of the basic or primary qualities of matter comprises "solidity, extension, figure (shape) and mobility."
Now as far as our ordinary idea of the objects around us is concerned, we normally conceive of them as having many other qualities in addition to those on Locke's list. For instance, the marigold has a striking color, the pineapple a characteristic taste, the perfume a distinctive aroma, and so on. But these qualities for Locke are merely powers that objects have in order to produce various sensations in us by means of their primary qualities.
Essentially when we conceive of an object as having shape, for example, there is, according to Locke, a "resemblance" between our idea of the object and how it really is: [the] patterns do really exist in the Bodies or the Objects themselves. But when we call an object sweet or blue, there is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies or Objects themselves. (These are secondary qualities whereas the other qualities are primary).
The real physical nature of the object, therefore, turns out to be for Locke very different in nature from how we often naively suppose it to be. A kind of veil interposes itself between our human sensory awareness of the world on the one hand, and on the other, the world as it "really " is.
Metaphysics: Leibniz (1646-1716)
The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, a supporter of the new mathematical corpuscular physics that flourished during the latter seventeenth century, came to the conclusion that the notion of substance provided essential metaphysical underpinning for a complete understanding of reality.
Leibniz proposed that the universe is of made up of "simple substances" which he designated as "Monads. " The Monad is similar to Democritus' concept of the "atom". Monads were indivisible and constantly active particles. Interestingly, Leibniz proposed that monads are more psychological entities, which in human beings are called "souls."
Each Monad is an isolated entity existing on its own in that no Monad interacts with others and that all that constitutes the Monad is contained within the Monad itself. Consequently, everything that happens does so because it necessarily must act in that fashion. The epistemologic implications of this contention lay in the consequent deduction that since the predicate is contained by definition in the subject, therefore, every truth is a necessary truth.
This is true because God has predetermined that this be the case. Had Got predetermined that a truth be otherwise it would have been so. This in turn leads to Leibniz's concept of the "best of all possible worlds" in which reality would have been otherwise if God would have thought it better to be so.
Utilizing the Ontological Argument, Leibniz understood God as a "necessary being" and in essence, for Leibniz, God is the original simple substance from which all Monads emerge, created and uncreated. God is the divine architect of the universe and the universe works with a machine like precision.
Metaphysics: Berkeley (1685-1783)
Descartes regarded matter as inert, passive extension. Both Descartes and Locke considered that our ideas of sensible properties (such as colors, tastes, smells) did not really inhere in or belong to the physical world, but rather were effect produced in the mind alone. Reflection on these issues and distinction led the Irish philosopher George Berkeley to the radical conclusion that nothing at all could be said to exist outside the mind.
Berkeley's immaterialism has often been regarded as an affront to common sense. Berkeley however refers to houses, mountains, and rivers, and to all those bodies, which compose the frame of the world. He does not deny the reality of such things but asserts that their existence consists in their being perceived. Berkeley put it in Latin, their esse est percipi or "to be is to be perceived."
So the consequent question emerges from Berkeley's Metaphysical conclusion, "Does the table in my study continue to exist when there is no one in the room?" Berkeley suggests at one point that to say it does, means that "if" I were in my study I would perceive it (a view sometimes called "Phenomenalism"). But Berkeley more characteristically advocated that tables, chairs, mountains, rivers and all natural phenomena do indeed have a being independent of the human perceiver. They exist in the "mind of some Eternal Spirit". God, therefore, is the divine perceiver.
The following has been offered as a response to, and a response on behalf of, Berkeley's conclusions:
There was a young man who said,
"God must think it exceedingly odd.
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad."
Reply:
“Dear Sir:
Your astonishment's odd:
I am always about in the Quad,
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by
Yours faithfully,
God.”
Berkeley offers a picture of reality as something essentially mind-dependent, and grounded in the divine consciousness.
Metaphysics: Descartes (1596-1650)
The notion of substance played a key role in the metaphysical thought of the Middle Ages.
But if the idea of an independent being is construed in the strongest possible sense, as something whose existence is entirely self-sufficient, then one might conclude that the term "substance" should strictly speaking be reserved for God alone, since according to standard Christian doctrine He alone is the eternal source of all being, and the existence of everything else is dependent on Him.
This is precisely the line taken several centuries later by Rene Descartes in his Principles of Philosophy. God, according to Descartes, is the sole substance in the strict sense. Created things can count as substances only in a secondary sense. But in his account of created things Descartes makes a striking departure from the framework for understanding reality, which Aristotle had offered. The Cartesian framework for explaining the physical world offers a radically new ontology.
Aristotle grouped individual substances together as belonging to natural kinds (species and genera) and among scholastic medieval philosophers (those who followed a broadly Aristotelian approach), a great deal of energy was spent on classifying natural phenomena and explaining the way things behaved in terms of essential characteristics of the natural kind to which they were taken to belong.
Ushering in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century Descartes argues, however, that to understand natural phenomena we need instead to adopt a mathematical approach. What matters for explanation in physics are not "differences in kind" but a quantitative analysis, expressible in terms of strict mathematical laws.
Consequently, we find in place of the traditional plurality of individual substances belonging to various natural kinds, just one essential kind of matter. The whole universe is composed of a single "extended stuff". All phenomena are to be explained quantitatively in terms of the size, shape and motion of its particles.
Descartes' account of the world conceives of matter as a single extended body, indefinitely modifiable as to its dimensions and dependent only on the supreme substance, God, for its existence and the movement of its parts.
To complete the picture, there are, in addition to the creator and the physical world, created minds or souls. These are individual centers of consciousness whose existence, Descartes maintains, does not require anything material.
Descartes' ontology, therefore, gives us three categories of substance. First substance in the strict sense, the independent, self sufficient creator, God; second, extended substance, or matter; and third thinking substance, the category to which created minds belong.
23.10.08
Metaphysics: Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)
Aristotle's approach to the nature of reality is more robustly down to earth than Plato's. He accepts the need to identify something stable and enduring in a world of constant change but he rejects the notion of universal Forms or essences in the Platonic sense of items with a reality of their own distinct from particular instances of things. For Aristotle, the ultimate units of being are individual substances, for example a particular man, or a particular horse.
Aristotle arrives at this view by likening the concept of a substance with the grammatical notion of a subject. In the sentence "Bucephalus is strong, "Bucephalus", the famous warhorse of Alexander the Great, is the subject and "strong" is the predicate. We may say that strength is predicated in the subject; the quality of strength is to be found in this horse. The subject, Bucephalus, by contrast, exists in its own right: it does not have to exist in something else.
Aristotle argues that substances possess accidental or contingent properties such as being fat or healthy, or fast, or lame. These properties may change from day to day, or year to year. But substances also have according to Aristotle essential characteristics which make them the kinds of thin they are. These universal essences, for Aristotle have no independent reality of their own right. They simply exist in the particular substances of which they are instances.
While Plato puts universals higher in the order of being (for instances particular horses are but pale copies of the Form of Horse), Aristotle reverses the order. It is individual substances (like a particular horse) that exist independently; equine properties or predicates and, for example, being quadruped having, a mane, being strong, and so on, cannot exist independently, but only in a particular subject.
In short, Plato said that the essence of "horseness" is in the World of Forms not in the particular horse. Aristotle said that the essence of "horseness" is in the particular horse itself.
Metaphysics: Plato (427-347 B.C.)
Plato proposed that the world of empirical observation, that which we see, touch, smell, etc., is not the real world. Rather the world experienced through the sense is a "shadow" world. It is only a reflection of the real world or the World of Forms or the World of Ideas. This world of “things” is only a "copy of the eternal world of spiritual Forms." (Colin Brown, Christianity and Philosophy, 15)
He demonstrated this metaphysical perspective through his allegory of the Cave in which he depicted a group of prisoners facing a wall upon which they are observing the shadows of real events taking place behind them. Never having seen the real events they mistake the shadows for reality. The allegory is intended to convey the transitory nature of this world and the importance of not confusing this world with ultimate reality. Only through a reorientation of our perspective and through rationality can we come to the recognition that the world of “stuff” which we observe is temporary or transitory. In contradistinction to what we experience in this world of shadows, the real world, authentic world consists of an unseen realm which Plato designated as the world of Ideas or Forms.
Plato's metaphysics is intimately linked to his theory of knowledge. He believed that in order to attain genuine knowledge we should go beyond the changing world of day-to-day particulars and grasp the timeless and unchanging universals of which ordinary objects are imperfect instances. For example, a particular beautiful object is only beautiful in a limited and passing way. It is a mere copy of the form of beauty, the "beauty itself."
Metaphysics: An Introduction
One of the oldest aspirations of philosophy has been to inquire into the ultimate nature of reality. The phrase sounds impressive enough, but what does it mean? Nowadays most people would say that investigating what there is, or what the world is like, is the job of the scientist, not the philosopher. But in earlier times the two roles were not clearly separated. When the writers of the Middle Ages described Aristotle as a philosopher (indeed he was known as The Philosopher), they were thinking partly of his accounts of the natural world, his physics, biology and so on.
The fact is that almost anyone who studies philosophy will sooner or late encounter disparaging remarks about the subject, such as that it is just hair-splitting and irrelevant - a subject best pursued by those who want to live in an ivory tower. However, Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) responds to such remarks with an aggressive defense of the value of philosophy. He argues that Philosophy has value not because it is likely to provide definitive answers to the questions it asks, but rather because the questions themselves are profound and important ones. Philosophical contemplation removes us from our narrow everyday concerns and takes us to a realm of generality, which can put our lives into a new perspective. Interestingly, Russell writes, "If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called 'philosophy', and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called 'the mathematical principles of natural philosophy'. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which a part of philosophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology." He concludes, "Thus to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy." (From Russell, "The Value of Philosophy" cited in Philosophy: Basic Readings", ed. Nigel Warburton (London: The Rutledge Group, 2004), 24-28.)]
But Aristotle also aimed to investigate the nature of being qua being, or being as such; he wanted to analyze the basic notions that are involved in our understanding of the world. The book in which he presents this idea of a general study of being is called the Metaphysics. The history of metaphysics is the history of various fundamental theories about "ontology" or "being". The paragraphs that follow, while not exhaustive of metaphysical speculation, reflect certain key concepts, ideas, and developmental direction of metaphysical of certain of the leading Philosophers.
21.10.08
Additional Attempted Solutions to the Problem of Evil and Suffering
The problem of evil and suffering continues to be a philosophical and existential challenge for the theist and the atheist. In addition to Leibniz's proposed solution to the coexistence of evil and God, additional arguments have also been proposed. These include the Saintliness Solution, the Artistic Analogy, and the Free Will Argument. In the following sections each of these is explained and objections to the arguments are presented.
THE SAINTLINESS SOLUTION
This proposed solution to the issue of the problem of evil and suffering acknowledges the presence of evil in the world. That evil's presence is not a "good" thing in itself; however, the solution proposes that evil can be justified since it produces greater moral goodness in the world than would be present without the presence of evil. In short, without the presence of evil in the world we would know little if anything of "saintliness" or virtuous behavior. (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 295; Warburton, The Basics, 22)
Objections:
1. The first objection focuses upon the degree and extent of suffering in the world. According to this objection there is a lack of proportionality between evil's presence and the amount of resultant good in the world. How can one justify the occurrence of the Holocaust and the near annihilation of an entire ethnic group on the basis that it produces a greater good? How can one argue that evil's presence produces a greater amount of good in the world in the face of the reality that much evil and suffering goes unnoticed by others? How can one justify the suffering and agony of one individual and the fact that this one individual suffering such pain, for instance, may be incapable of making the personal improvement, for which the solution calls?
2. Second, it has been argued that it is not obvious or clear that a world in which evil exists and thereby produces greater good in certain individuals and society is any better than a world in which no evil exists and, consequently, fewer saints and heroes are produced. Wouldn't it be better for a child to live in a world without the presence of evil, with no cancer for instance, than for a child to live in a world where evil is present and whose cancer is justified on the basis of how much good will be produced by this particular medical condition?
3. The Saintliness Argument or solution should also be addressed on a theological level. The objection assumes God's existence but leads to questions concerning his nature. According to the Saintliness Argument evil can be justified on the grounds of the consequent good, which is produced by its presence. However, if God is all-knowing, couldn’t God have found another way to produce greater good in the world? If God is all-powerful, couldn’t God have created a way for such good to be produced without the presence of evil? Does the presence of evil in the world challenge the idea that God is all-good? I often present my students with the following hypothetical: imagine that you are walking by the train tracks one day. You observe a child playing on the tracks with the locomotive fast approaching. Supposing that the child was deaf and could not hear the train, or that the child was unable to deliver himself from the situation, would not the compassionate human being be compelled to race to the child and save it from the situation? If it is true that humans are capable of such compassion and rescue, how much more so should it be true of God? If the above scenario is true of humans who are limited in knowledge and power, how much more cruel is "God" in that He is assumed to be "all-powerful" and "all-knowing" and consequently, more than capable of remedying the situation?
THE ARTISTIC ANALOGY
This Artistic Analogy contends that just as in any great piece of art, whether music or painting for example, there is dissonance and just as that dissonance contributes to the overall beauty and harmony of the artistic piece, so also evil in the world contributes to the overall beauty and harmony of the world. The argument further contends that in any great piece of art this dissonance is resolved in some fashion which hints at an eschatological resolution to the problem of evil and suffering.
Objections:
1. The argument from Artistic Analogy fails in that it is difficult, if not impossible to believe and even seems to border on the absurd. How could one's suffering, for instance a child with leukemia or a prisoner dying a horrible death in the holocaust or a prisoner who is being cruelly tortured, contribute to the overall harmony and beauty of the world? In addition, as stated above, what of those individuals whose suffering occurs without any knowledge of it? How is this personal suffering and agony contributing to the overall beauty and harmony of the world?
2. The second objection to the Artistic Analogy also addresses the Theistic assumption regarding the nature of God. It has been argued that the analogy makes God appear to be more of a sadist than an omnibenevolent deity described by the Theists. Some have even proposed that in the Artistic Analogy, God more closely resembles a psychopathic terrorist who throws a bomb into a crowded group of people in order to see the beautiful patterns created by the explosion than a God who is all good. (Warburton, The Basics, 23)
THE FREEWILL DEFENSE
The Freewill Defense proposes that evil and suffering in the world are the result of human beings’ free will. According to this solution, evil and suffering are inevitable consequences of human free will. Further, the solution contends that living in a world which contains evil and suffering as a consequence of human free will is superior to living in a world in which there is no evil and suffering as a result of the absence of human free will. The absence of freedom of choice would mean that humanity is nothing more than a group of automatons programmed for predetermined actions which would in turn render all such actions meaningless since there would be no moral accountability for those actions.
Objections:
1. The Freewill Defense of evil and suffering explains only moral evil or humanity’s inhumanity to others. There is no relationship between free will and natural evil with the exception being a theological link between the Fall of Adam and Eve for instance in which the abuse of free will is also understood to have produced not only moral evil or man's inhumanity to man, but also natural evil such as tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, etc.
2. If God is omnipotent and omniscient it is therefore within his power to have created a world in which free will is present without the consequence of evil and suffering as an inevitable result. While it is true that on a human level there seems to be at least a perceived link and even necessity between the human free will and evil and suffering, is this so from a divine perspective? Could not God, by virtue of his being all-knowing, all-powerful, and all good, have created a world which contains both free will and evil?
3. The Freewill Defense makes two basic and erroneous assumptions. The primary assumption is that it contends that a world with free will and the potentiality of evil is to be preferred to a world of automatons that are incapable of evil actions. But is this really so? Isn't there a suffering so great that it would be preferable to have human automatons devoid of the capability of free will rather than having the consequent potential of suffering? The Freewill Defense also assumes that human free will actually exists, a topic that is highly debated on the basis of human in the context of neuropsychology and behavioral psychology.
THE SAINTLINESS SOLUTION
This proposed solution to the issue of the problem of evil and suffering acknowledges the presence of evil in the world. That evil's presence is not a "good" thing in itself; however, the solution proposes that evil can be justified since it produces greater moral goodness in the world than would be present without the presence of evil. In short, without the presence of evil in the world we would know little if anything of "saintliness" or virtuous behavior. (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 295; Warburton, The Basics, 22)
Objections:
1. The first objection focuses upon the degree and extent of suffering in the world. According to this objection there is a lack of proportionality between evil's presence and the amount of resultant good in the world. How can one justify the occurrence of the Holocaust and the near annihilation of an entire ethnic group on the basis that it produces a greater good? How can one argue that evil's presence produces a greater amount of good in the world in the face of the reality that much evil and suffering goes unnoticed by others? How can one justify the suffering and agony of one individual and the fact that this one individual suffering such pain, for instance, may be incapable of making the personal improvement, for which the solution calls?
2. Second, it has been argued that it is not obvious or clear that a world in which evil exists and thereby produces greater good in certain individuals and society is any better than a world in which no evil exists and, consequently, fewer saints and heroes are produced. Wouldn't it be better for a child to live in a world without the presence of evil, with no cancer for instance, than for a child to live in a world where evil is present and whose cancer is justified on the basis of how much good will be produced by this particular medical condition?
3. The Saintliness Argument or solution should also be addressed on a theological level. The objection assumes God's existence but leads to questions concerning his nature. According to the Saintliness Argument evil can be justified on the grounds of the consequent good, which is produced by its presence. However, if God is all-knowing, couldn’t God have found another way to produce greater good in the world? If God is all-powerful, couldn’t God have created a way for such good to be produced without the presence of evil? Does the presence of evil in the world challenge the idea that God is all-good? I often present my students with the following hypothetical: imagine that you are walking by the train tracks one day. You observe a child playing on the tracks with the locomotive fast approaching. Supposing that the child was deaf and could not hear the train, or that the child was unable to deliver himself from the situation, would not the compassionate human being be compelled to race to the child and save it from the situation? If it is true that humans are capable of such compassion and rescue, how much more so should it be true of God? If the above scenario is true of humans who are limited in knowledge and power, how much more cruel is "God" in that He is assumed to be "all-powerful" and "all-knowing" and consequently, more than capable of remedying the situation?
THE ARTISTIC ANALOGY
This Artistic Analogy contends that just as in any great piece of art, whether music or painting for example, there is dissonance and just as that dissonance contributes to the overall beauty and harmony of the artistic piece, so also evil in the world contributes to the overall beauty and harmony of the world. The argument further contends that in any great piece of art this dissonance is resolved in some fashion which hints at an eschatological resolution to the problem of evil and suffering.
Objections:
1. The argument from Artistic Analogy fails in that it is difficult, if not impossible to believe and even seems to border on the absurd. How could one's suffering, for instance a child with leukemia or a prisoner dying a horrible death in the holocaust or a prisoner who is being cruelly tortured, contribute to the overall harmony and beauty of the world? In addition, as stated above, what of those individuals whose suffering occurs without any knowledge of it? How is this personal suffering and agony contributing to the overall beauty and harmony of the world?
2. The second objection to the Artistic Analogy also addresses the Theistic assumption regarding the nature of God. It has been argued that the analogy makes God appear to be more of a sadist than an omnibenevolent deity described by the Theists. Some have even proposed that in the Artistic Analogy, God more closely resembles a psychopathic terrorist who throws a bomb into a crowded group of people in order to see the beautiful patterns created by the explosion than a God who is all good. (Warburton, The Basics, 23)
THE FREEWILL DEFENSE
The Freewill Defense proposes that evil and suffering in the world are the result of human beings’ free will. According to this solution, evil and suffering are inevitable consequences of human free will. Further, the solution contends that living in a world which contains evil and suffering as a consequence of human free will is superior to living in a world in which there is no evil and suffering as a result of the absence of human free will. The absence of freedom of choice would mean that humanity is nothing more than a group of automatons programmed for predetermined actions which would in turn render all such actions meaningless since there would be no moral accountability for those actions.
Objections:
1. The Freewill Defense of evil and suffering explains only moral evil or humanity’s inhumanity to others. There is no relationship between free will and natural evil with the exception being a theological link between the Fall of Adam and Eve for instance in which the abuse of free will is also understood to have produced not only moral evil or man's inhumanity to man, but also natural evil such as tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, etc.
2. If God is omnipotent and omniscient it is therefore within his power to have created a world in which free will is present without the consequence of evil and suffering as an inevitable result. While it is true that on a human level there seems to be at least a perceived link and even necessity between the human free will and evil and suffering, is this so from a divine perspective? Could not God, by virtue of his being all-knowing, all-powerful, and all good, have created a world which contains both free will and evil?
3. The Freewill Defense makes two basic and erroneous assumptions. The primary assumption is that it contends that a world with free will and the potentiality of evil is to be preferred to a world of automatons that are incapable of evil actions. But is this really so? Isn't there a suffering so great that it would be preferable to have human automatons devoid of the capability of free will rather than having the consequent potential of suffering? The Freewill Defense also assumes that human free will actually exists, a topic that is highly debated on the basis of human in the context of neuropsychology and behavioral psychology.
18.10.08
Leibniz: The Best of All Possible Worlds
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) presented one of the more interesting efforts to reconcile the existence of God, evil and suffering. His categorization of evil was threefold. First, there is metaphysical evil. Metaphysical evil is the consequence of the reality that the world, unlike its Creator, is finite and limited. Second in Leibniz's theory there is physical evil. Physical evil, such as pain, is justified in that it gives rise to higher values. Greater goods are produced by physical evil; they are goods that we would otherwise not know. (Leibniz, Theodicy, 1710) For example, in order for virtue to be evidenced, there must be evil and suffering. Without hunger, no act of good will to feed the hungry would be known. Without suffering, no act attempting to alleviate physical suffering would be known. Without disease, no effort to eliminate disease would be known. Without war, no acts of heroism or self-sacrifice would be known. According to Leibniz's approach to the problem, the existence of physical evil is, therefore, a necessary and justified presence in the world.
Leibniz's final category for evil is moral. For Leibniz, moral evil poses the greater problem than metaphysical or physical evil. Moral evil is in essence, according to Leibniz, a deficiency. It is a negative reality. Moral evil as deficiency posed a challenge for Leibniz, a philosopher who was a metaphysical optimist. He concluded that while God does not desire moral evil, he permits it to exist and he does so because its existence constitutes a basis for greater good. As finite limited creatures we cannot render the final verdict regarding the negativity of moral evil since we simply do not have all of the facts. We do not know God's total plan. This divine plan is a mystery, ponderable but ultimately unknown to limited creatures. We can only reference and find confidence in God's nature in the presence of this reality. As frail creatures of dust, we can only stand in the presence of this metaphysical mystery of moral evil with epistemologic humility affirming that, by virtue of the nature of the Creator of the world, we can have confidence that this order contains what God has assessed to be the greatest amount of the good and the least amount of the bad which are both tolerated and permitted after His examination of all the infinite creative possibilities and potentialities which He could have flung into existence. Therefore, though far from perfect, the world in which we now live is God's best of all possible worlds. In Leibniz's best of all possible worlds, evil is a necessary element in the world and without it the world would be adversely affected in its very design. It appears that for Leibniz there is a paradoxical dimension to the existence of evil in the world in that imperfection, while an intrusive component, is also a necessary component and is woven into the very fabric of the created order.
Utilizing the Ontological Argument for God's existence, Leibniz believed that God, by virtue of His being perfect, is all-powerful and morally perfect. Therefore, God by virtue of his perfection was required to create the best of all possible worlds since to do otherwise would violate God's very nature and, God being perfect, He could not have done otherwise. For Leibniz, this reality constitutes the principle of sufficient reason or the reason why things are as they are. In short, "whatever worlds there is, is so of necessity." (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz", 493) For Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason as applied to the existence of a world in which there is evil and suffering resides in the twofold foundation of God's initial choice to create a world since there could have been no world unless God actually chose to create a world, and the nature of God as perfect and all powerful which requires that he produce the best possible world.
17.10.08
The Gambler's Argument
Blaise Pascal advocated what has been designated as "The Gambler's Argument" for the existence of God. This particular argument differs from those previously cited. The Teleological, Cosmological and Ontological Arguments strive to provide a logical and rational foundation, which gives credibility to belief in God's existence. However, the Gambler's Argument does not advocate belief in God's existence on the basis of logic and rationality so much as it advocates belief in God's existence based upon one's self-interest.
Pascal's friends were gamblers. It seems that they refused belief in the existence of a deity. Pascal's argument is the result of his desire to find an argument that would compel his peers to reverse their decision. Pascal proposed that essentially his "gambling buddies" should think of belief in God, or in their cases "disbelief” in God's existence, in terms of the ultimate gamble. On the one hand, to believe in God and die only to discover that God does not exist is to lose absolutely nothing. On the other hand, to disbelieve in God and die to discover that God actually does exist is to lose it all. For Pascal his friends were putting it all on the line. Consequently, the shrewd gambler will place his "bets" on the possibility that God exists.
Pascal's wager focuses upon four possible outcomes.
1. If we bet on the existence of God and win (God exists) then we gain eternal life.
2. If we bet on the existence of God and God does not exist nothing is lost. We may miss out on certain worldly pleasures, waste many hours praying, and live our lives under an illusion, but this is nothing compared with the loss of placing our bet on the perceived likelihood that he does not exist only to find that he actually does.
3. If we choose to bet on the option that God does not exist and we win (God does not exist, then we live a life without illusion and feel free to indulge in the pleasures of this life without fear of divine punishment.
4. If we choose to bet on the option that God does not exist and lose (God does exist) then we at least miss the chance of eternal life, and may even run the risk of eternal damnation.
Pascal determined that the most rational course of action is to believe that God does exist. However, as previously stated, the rationality of Pascal's proposal is highly questionable. The argument appears to be based in little more than pure self-interest.
Objections:
1. A person cannot simply decide to believe. The argument provides no rational basis for belief in God's existence. An individual simply cannot decide to "believe" in God's existence. Belief in God requires more than a casual assent to a proposition. Is there not a difference in simply deciding to believe a proposition and genuinely arriving at the conclusion that a statement actually reflects "truth?"
2. The argument seems to trivialize the issue of God's existence. Pascal's proposal seems to call for insincere commitment to a profound possibility. In fact, William James (1842-1910) argued that if he were God in the dilemma proposed by Pascal, he would take great delight in “preventing people who believed in him on the basis of this procedure from going to heaven." (Nigel Warburton, Philosophy: The Basics, 32)
Hume on Miracles
The primary preoccupation of Philosophy of Religion has been with attempts to establish the existence of God by rational means. Consequently, the writer's previous posts have focused primarily upon this topic. However another area of concern has been that of the validity of the miraculous which is also used as an evidence of God's existence.
David Hume, however, launched one of the most renowned challenges to the validity of the miraculous, in his "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding” (1748), section X. On the one hand Hume grants that "eyewitness accounts" of events are "useful and necessary" to human life. However, he also contends that the usefulness of such testimony is inversely related to the uniqueness or unusualness of the event to which the eyewitness is attesting. (See Western Philosophy: An Anthology, ed., John Cottingham, (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 370. Hume further determines that the validity of the eyewitness account is dependent upon the credibility of the individual providing the account and, in regards to the miraculous, he concludes that although there is always the possibility that a miracle has occurred such an occurrence is highly unlikely. (Nigel Warburton, Philosophy: The Basics, 28)
Regarding eyewitness credibility, Hume argued the eyewitnesses to the miraculous could only be regarded as legitimate by meeting the following criteria:
1. Numerous
2. Intelligent
3. Highly educated
4. Of unquestioned integrity
5. Willing to undergo severe loss if proven to be mistaken
6. Presenting claims publicly
In short, Hume argued that the criteria for establishing the occurrence of a miracle should center on likelihood that the "falsehood of the testimony would be more miraculous than the fact of the occurrence of the miracle which it endeavors to establish". (Woodfin, With All Your Mind, 71) For Hume, "most so-called miracles are based on deception or limited knowledge." (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 50) His criteria for miracles and the unlikelihood of their actual occurrence are firmly rooted in the scientific worldview and also represent the metaphysical perspective of deism. (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 50)
Hume's conclusions regarding the unlikely occurrence of the miraculous are based upon the following arguments:
1) Miracles are always improbable. Hume argued that there is always more evidence that a miracle has not occurred than there is that a miracle has occurred. Consequently, the wise person will be reluctant to believe the report of a miracle’s occurrence. Always leaving the door open, so to speak, Hume concludes that while a miracle is possible, the occurrence of a miracle is highly improbable. Applying the argument to the concept of Resurrection, Hume concludes that while the occurrence of a Resurrection is always possible, it is also improbable.
2) Psychological factors can lead individuals to be misled or even be fraudulent in their report of a miracle’s occurrence. Hume points out that there is something within the individual which desires to be a part of the "miraculous" since being part of such an event sets us apart. In addition we have a strong inclination to believe the improbable. The dispositions incline us toward belief in the miraculous in Hume's opinion.
3) Religions cancel out one another. Hume indicates that all of the world's religions believe in miracles. The existence of "gods" would be confirmed by the occurrence of the miraculous. The occurrence of the miraculous in each of the religions would, according to Hume, prove the existence of the different "gods" of each religion. The ultimate result is that these religions cancel one another out.
Hume presents a threefold argument:
The widely held view of miracles as violations of a law of nature is incoherent, that the evidence for even the most likely miracle will always be counterbalanced by the evidence establishing the law of nature that the miracle allegedly violates, and that the evidence supporting any given miracles is necessarily suspect. (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, Robert Audi, ed., 402)
In short, the occurrence of the miraculous, according to Hume, is possible but highly improbable and therefore should never be used as a proof of God's existence due to the unlikelihood of their occurrence.
13.10.08
Arguments Against the Existence of God
In the Middle Ages discussion concerning the rational proofs of God's existence was primarily carried on between Christian philosophers/theologians. With the emergence of the Modern Era, the discussion regarding God and belief in God's existence took on a new dimension. Intellectual atheism emerged at this time arguing that the idea of "God" had lost intellectual credibility.
The elimination of "God" occurred in progressive steps. First, this elimination of "God" unfolded in the form of the initial critique of the "First Cause" as a result of alternative explanations such as that of Newtonian physics. Second, intellectuals then initiated a critique of the Concept of God (at least the traditional concept of God) through philosophical analysis. Finally, there occurred an attack on the very idea of God, which is evidenced in the work of individuals such as Feuerbach and Nietzsche. The following material will examine certain of the Philosophers who represent the intellectual atheism.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)
Johann Fichte was a nineteenth century German Philosopher who challenged the Christian concept of God. He argued that the conception of God as personal and infinite is "self-contradictory". According to Fichte God cannot be both "personal" and "infinite" at the same time since to argue that God is "personal" is to link God with the idea of "substance" which confines the "being" of God and therefore eliminates the possibility of God's being "infinite." In short, the notions of God as personal and infinite are mutually exclusive. Fichte presented his analysis of the concept of God as person by utilizing a relational analogy. According to Fichte's understanding, personhood relationally understood implies limitation. As "person" there is a point at which I stop, so to speak, and another person begins. This demonstrates the conclusion that personhood implies limitation and finiteness. Therefore, Fichte concluded it to be inappropriate to conceive of God as "person" since the very notion implies limit and "God" is unlimited or "infinite." Consequently, for Fichte, the concept of personhood simply cannot be used to describe that which by nature is unlimited. (Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, 118)
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872)
Feuerbach approached the issue of God's existence from the psychological perspective. According to Feuerbach, the traits, which are attributed to the supposed God who exists, are projections of human characteristics. It was Feuerbach's intention to "obliterate" the very idea of God's existence and he attempted to do so by reducing God's existence to a psychological event. In so doing, Feuerbach contended that the idea of God is nothing more than an illusion produced by the human mind. He countered that, rather than proposing the existence of "God" humanity should simply acknowledge the universal greatness of humanity the denial of which has led to the human need for God's existence. (Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 38)
Karl Marx (1818-1883)
Karl Marx proposed that "God" is nothing more than humanity’s effort to cope with social loneliness and alienation in the human condition. His most well known contention described religion as "the opiate of the people” by which he intended to convey the idea that religion is the means whereby individuals are manipulated into accepting the economic status quo. All religion and one's belief in God’s existence is nothing more than a means of anesthetizing people to the tragic social conditions by which they are surrounded. Marx also argued that as social conditions improve through class revolution the need for religion and belief in God will diminish. (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 332)
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)
One of the more interesting and complicated efforts to eliminate "God" thought was produced by Friedrich Nietzsche. The object of Nietzsche's attack was God himself. (Colin Brown, Philosophy and Christian Faith, 138) His very starting point was the non-existence of God. For Nietzsche, "God is dead." (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, No. 343, 275) Consequently, Nietzsche concluded that humanity is left to fend for itself so to speak. God does not exist. Humanity must pave its own path. Humanity must go it alone. In particular Nietzsche, the son of a Lutheran pastor, demonstrated extreme hostility toward Christianity. For Nietzsche, Christianity advocates nothing less than a "slave morality" which reflects the resentment of the weak toward the strong. Those who failed to have the courage to master their own passions (Christians) and who lack inner strength of character (Christians) seek revenge toward those stronger than themselves. This desire for revenge is seen not in this life, but in conceptions of the "fictional" life to come, where "God" will carry out vengeance on behalf of the adherents of this "slave morality." Especially interesting is Nietzsche's counter proposal to the slave morality. He called for "the Superman" or the Ubermensch and with this concept intended the individual who realizes the human predicament, creates his own values and shapes life accordingly. To do otherwise and to depend upon a morality based on "God belief" is to demonstrate weakness. In short, the Nietzschean Super Man is one who has encountered the adversity of life and who has overcome these challenges through the Will to Power and in turn triumphs over weakness and despises the presence of weakness in others. (Colin Brown, Philosophy and Christian Faith, 139-40) Thus, Nietzsche's contention that what does not kill me makes me stronger.
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
According to Freud God is a human construct and religious beliefs are born of infantile feelings of helplessness and fear. Consequently, Freud proposed that "God" is nothing more than the projection of the need for a Cosmic Father Figure. The idea of God's existence is an invention upon which we rely in order to endure in the midst of a hostile cosmos. In addition, "God" is the byproduct of psychological repression. Humanity has failed to come to grips with the reality that we are on our own and the result of this repression of the way things really are is neurosis, psychosis and even the paranoid delusion of an all knowing God, Father figure, who watches over us with the threat of punish or reward. For Freud, religion is a curse not a blessing, the reason for humanity’s problems and not the solution to them. This infantile need for "God" must be abandoned. It is time for humanity to "grow up" so to speak and stand on our own two feet. (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 330)
The elimination of "God" occurred in progressive steps. First, this elimination of "God" unfolded in the form of the initial critique of the "First Cause" as a result of alternative explanations such as that of Newtonian physics. Second, intellectuals then initiated a critique of the Concept of God (at least the traditional concept of God) through philosophical analysis. Finally, there occurred an attack on the very idea of God, which is evidenced in the work of individuals such as Feuerbach and Nietzsche. The following material will examine certain of the Philosophers who represent the intellectual atheism.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)
Johann Fichte was a nineteenth century German Philosopher who challenged the Christian concept of God. He argued that the conception of God as personal and infinite is "self-contradictory". According to Fichte God cannot be both "personal" and "infinite" at the same time since to argue that God is "personal" is to link God with the idea of "substance" which confines the "being" of God and therefore eliminates the possibility of God's being "infinite." In short, the notions of God as personal and infinite are mutually exclusive. Fichte presented his analysis of the concept of God as person by utilizing a relational analogy. According to Fichte's understanding, personhood relationally understood implies limitation. As "person" there is a point at which I stop, so to speak, and another person begins. This demonstrates the conclusion that personhood implies limitation and finiteness. Therefore, Fichte concluded it to be inappropriate to conceive of God as "person" since the very notion implies limit and "God" is unlimited or "infinite." Consequently, for Fichte, the concept of personhood simply cannot be used to describe that which by nature is unlimited. (Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, 118)
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872)
Feuerbach approached the issue of God's existence from the psychological perspective. According to Feuerbach, the traits, which are attributed to the supposed God who exists, are projections of human characteristics. It was Feuerbach's intention to "obliterate" the very idea of God's existence and he attempted to do so by reducing God's existence to a psychological event. In so doing, Feuerbach contended that the idea of God is nothing more than an illusion produced by the human mind. He countered that, rather than proposing the existence of "God" humanity should simply acknowledge the universal greatness of humanity the denial of which has led to the human need for God's existence. (Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 38)
Karl Marx (1818-1883)
Karl Marx proposed that "God" is nothing more than humanity’s effort to cope with social loneliness and alienation in the human condition. His most well known contention described religion as "the opiate of the people” by which he intended to convey the idea that religion is the means whereby individuals are manipulated into accepting the economic status quo. All religion and one's belief in God’s existence is nothing more than a means of anesthetizing people to the tragic social conditions by which they are surrounded. Marx also argued that as social conditions improve through class revolution the need for religion and belief in God will diminish. (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 332)
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)
One of the more interesting and complicated efforts to eliminate "God" thought was produced by Friedrich Nietzsche. The object of Nietzsche's attack was God himself. (Colin Brown, Philosophy and Christian Faith, 138) His very starting point was the non-existence of God. For Nietzsche, "God is dead." (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, No. 343, 275) Consequently, Nietzsche concluded that humanity is left to fend for itself so to speak. God does not exist. Humanity must pave its own path. Humanity must go it alone. In particular Nietzsche, the son of a Lutheran pastor, demonstrated extreme hostility toward Christianity. For Nietzsche, Christianity advocates nothing less than a "slave morality" which reflects the resentment of the weak toward the strong. Those who failed to have the courage to master their own passions (Christians) and who lack inner strength of character (Christians) seek revenge toward those stronger than themselves. This desire for revenge is seen not in this life, but in conceptions of the "fictional" life to come, where "God" will carry out vengeance on behalf of the adherents of this "slave morality." Especially interesting is Nietzsche's counter proposal to the slave morality. He called for "the Superman" or the Ubermensch and with this concept intended the individual who realizes the human predicament, creates his own values and shapes life accordingly. To do otherwise and to depend upon a morality based on "God belief" is to demonstrate weakness. In short, the Nietzschean Super Man is one who has encountered the adversity of life and who has overcome these challenges through the Will to Power and in turn triumphs over weakness and despises the presence of weakness in others. (Colin Brown, Philosophy and Christian Faith, 139-40) Thus, Nietzsche's contention that what does not kill me makes me stronger.
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
According to Freud God is a human construct and religious beliefs are born of infantile feelings of helplessness and fear. Consequently, Freud proposed that "God" is nothing more than the projection of the need for a Cosmic Father Figure. The idea of God's existence is an invention upon which we rely in order to endure in the midst of a hostile cosmos. In addition, "God" is the byproduct of psychological repression. Humanity has failed to come to grips with the reality that we are on our own and the result of this repression of the way things really are is neurosis, psychosis and even the paranoid delusion of an all knowing God, Father figure, who watches over us with the threat of punish or reward. For Freud, religion is a curse not a blessing, the reason for humanity’s problems and not the solution to them. This infantile need for "God" must be abandoned. It is time for humanity to "grow up" so to speak and stand on our own two feet. (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 330)
12.10.08
Limitations on the Rational Arguments
1. The Problem of Abstraction. As stated in the objections to each of the above arguments, each fails to tell us anything of the nature of the deity whose existence is rationally propped up. This will be elaborated upon later in this list.
2. The Problem of Detachment. The above stated rational arguments also remove the rationally pursued "Deity" from one's life context or experience. Divinity is thereby not only an abstraction, but also a remote or removed abstraction.
3. The Problem of Inverse Proportionality. Of all the challenges this seems at least for this writer the most difficult to get one's mind around. It is proposed that the arguments have a paradoxical nature. A greater concept of "perfection" it is argued leads to a diminished need for a perfect deity. A greater understanding of the "design" of the universe inversely leads to the diminished need for a grand "Designer." (Woodfin, With All Your Mind, 48)
4. The Problem of Analogy. Analogical arguments attempt to take the facts as related to one dimension and apply them to another. In this "crossing over" lies the Problem of Analogy. While the problem is inherent in all linguistic efforts, after all language is all symbolic or analogical by its very nature, it seems especially to be present with regard to the rational arguments. For instance, how can we take the understanding, which we have of the "watch" which leads to the need for a "watch maker" and apply that on a much more grand scale to the Divine, or Cosmic Watchmaker designing the universe?
5. The Problem of Probability. Philosophers state the problem as "the problem of theism and probability." (Woodfin, With All Your Mind, 49) The above stated arguments are presented in reference to this one known universe, but at the same time the arguments attempt to argue how much better this universe is as created by the Divine in contrast to one not created by the Divine.
6. The Problem of Frame of Reference. The above presented objections by Gaunilon to the Ontological Argument demonstrate just such a problem. It will be remembered that, in response to Anselm's contention that the concept of perfection requires existence, Gaunilon countered that this logic necessitates the existence of the perfect Island of which one can conceive. Anselm counter-responded that the contention is only true of the concept of God, not all conceptions. Bertrand Russell also responds to this challenge when he argues and hypothesizes the following: Suppose the observance of a pair of scales. There are ten ounces on one side. Those ten ounces are outweighed by something on the other side of the scale. We do not know nor can we observe what that "something" is. Hume grants that the observer may legitimately assume that the unseen object weighs more than the ten ounce item. However, Hume contends that it could never be concluded that the unseen amount weighs one hundred ounces for instance and, even more so, one could never conclude that the unseen amount contains the weight of infinity. (David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 40)
7. The Problem of Unity. How can one be assured that of the above presented arguments, each point to the same "God?" The arguments might be interpreted as a basis for "polytheism" rather than "monotheism."
8. The Problem of the Impersonal. Again, what is this "Divinity" whose existence is "proven" like? Is he a perfect being? Is he a Cosmic Cause? Is he a Carpenter-like Designer or an Engineer-like Enigma? What is he like? We simply cannot know.
It is likely at this point that the wide eyed optimistic Christian theist proudly, naively, perhaps even pompously, pops up and states that he can "fill in the blank for each of these objections." Really?
While this is difficult for many within the Christian Theistic context to admit to themselves, even more so to others, their approach is at least as problematic, if not more so. It might even be argued that their ontologic perspective is perhaps even more fraught with difficulty by virtue of the attempt to prove that "God" is personal. How do we arrive at this conclusion regarding the nature of deity without the benefit of revelation? How does one verify another's revelation, especially with regard to the nature of God? How does one arrive at the conclusion that God is a personal God who deeply desires a relationship with humanity without the benefit of belief in a special revelation of that truth through the religious text in the person of "Jesus" who allegedly himself claimed to be the interpretive clue (Woodfin) to the Divine and all of reality?
In fact, it should be noted that British empiricism emerged in reaction to the British claim of revelation, which in turn gave birth to the concept of the "divine right of kings". How does one counter the king's argument that he or she has a divine right to certain levels of authority when the basis for the doctrine of the "divine right of kings" is one's revelation from God? Does one simply counter, “God told me this” in response to another’s contention, “God told me that”?
In short, how does one challenge the legitimacy of another's revelation? It is not just the claim to authoritative reason, which has led to movements laced with lunacy. So it seems that at least some of the above stated limitations, if not many of the limitations, and perhaps all of them, are even more pronounced for the Christian Theist who takes the understanding of this metaphysical reality called "God" even further than do the rational arguments. In other words, the authoritative claim rooted in revelation leads to a more complicated dilemma than the authoritative claim based in reason.
2. The Problem of Detachment. The above stated rational arguments also remove the rationally pursued "Deity" from one's life context or experience. Divinity is thereby not only an abstraction, but also a remote or removed abstraction.
3. The Problem of Inverse Proportionality. Of all the challenges this seems at least for this writer the most difficult to get one's mind around. It is proposed that the arguments have a paradoxical nature. A greater concept of "perfection" it is argued leads to a diminished need for a perfect deity. A greater understanding of the "design" of the universe inversely leads to the diminished need for a grand "Designer." (Woodfin, With All Your Mind, 48)
4. The Problem of Analogy. Analogical arguments attempt to take the facts as related to one dimension and apply them to another. In this "crossing over" lies the Problem of Analogy. While the problem is inherent in all linguistic efforts, after all language is all symbolic or analogical by its very nature, it seems especially to be present with regard to the rational arguments. For instance, how can we take the understanding, which we have of the "watch" which leads to the need for a "watch maker" and apply that on a much more grand scale to the Divine, or Cosmic Watchmaker designing the universe?
5. The Problem of Probability. Philosophers state the problem as "the problem of theism and probability." (Woodfin, With All Your Mind, 49) The above stated arguments are presented in reference to this one known universe, but at the same time the arguments attempt to argue how much better this universe is as created by the Divine in contrast to one not created by the Divine.
6. The Problem of Frame of Reference. The above presented objections by Gaunilon to the Ontological Argument demonstrate just such a problem. It will be remembered that, in response to Anselm's contention that the concept of perfection requires existence, Gaunilon countered that this logic necessitates the existence of the perfect Island of which one can conceive. Anselm counter-responded that the contention is only true of the concept of God, not all conceptions. Bertrand Russell also responds to this challenge when he argues and hypothesizes the following: Suppose the observance of a pair of scales. There are ten ounces on one side. Those ten ounces are outweighed by something on the other side of the scale. We do not know nor can we observe what that "something" is. Hume grants that the observer may legitimately assume that the unseen object weighs more than the ten ounce item. However, Hume contends that it could never be concluded that the unseen amount weighs one hundred ounces for instance and, even more so, one could never conclude that the unseen amount contains the weight of infinity. (David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 40)
7. The Problem of Unity. How can one be assured that of the above presented arguments, each point to the same "God?" The arguments might be interpreted as a basis for "polytheism" rather than "monotheism."
8. The Problem of the Impersonal. Again, what is this "Divinity" whose existence is "proven" like? Is he a perfect being? Is he a Cosmic Cause? Is he a Carpenter-like Designer or an Engineer-like Enigma? What is he like? We simply cannot know.
It is likely at this point that the wide eyed optimistic Christian theist proudly, naively, perhaps even pompously, pops up and states that he can "fill in the blank for each of these objections." Really?
While this is difficult for many within the Christian Theistic context to admit to themselves, even more so to others, their approach is at least as problematic, if not more so. It might even be argued that their ontologic perspective is perhaps even more fraught with difficulty by virtue of the attempt to prove that "God" is personal. How do we arrive at this conclusion regarding the nature of deity without the benefit of revelation? How does one verify another's revelation, especially with regard to the nature of God? How does one arrive at the conclusion that God is a personal God who deeply desires a relationship with humanity without the benefit of belief in a special revelation of that truth through the religious text in the person of "Jesus" who allegedly himself claimed to be the interpretive clue (Woodfin) to the Divine and all of reality?
In fact, it should be noted that British empiricism emerged in reaction to the British claim of revelation, which in turn gave birth to the concept of the "divine right of kings". How does one counter the king's argument that he or she has a divine right to certain levels of authority when the basis for the doctrine of the "divine right of kings" is one's revelation from God? Does one simply counter, “God told me this” in response to another’s contention, “God told me that”?
In short, how does one challenge the legitimacy of another's revelation? It is not just the claim to authoritative reason, which has led to movements laced with lunacy. So it seems that at least some of the above stated limitations, if not many of the limitations, and perhaps all of them, are even more pronounced for the Christian Theist who takes the understanding of this metaphysical reality called "God" even further than do the rational arguments. In other words, the authoritative claim rooted in revelation leads to a more complicated dilemma than the authoritative claim based in reason.
11.10.08
The Moral Argument
The Moral Argument for God's existence consists of the following premises: All sane adults have a sense of morality. Each individual, though he or she has a sense of right and wrong, has experientially failed to live up to their standard. Consequently, immortality would be required in order to achieve this inherent human desire for perfection and wholeness. In order to provide eternity as the context for living up to this moral standard, God must exist. The argument postulates that the existence of God emerges from "the ethical possibility that men have of seeking the summum bonum or highest value." (Woodfin, Mind, 46). In other words, the quest for the fulfillment of one's moral standard requires the context of immortality in order for there to be ongoing progress in one's striving for the goal. Therefore, the creation of this context of immortality requires God's existence.
The argument was presented by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant argued that the existence of God must be assumed by the individual since without God's existence there would be no immortality of the soul or any meaningful opportunity to fulfill the moral requirements of the Categorical Imperative proposed by him. In short, Kant summarized this sense of morality as an innate awareness of the individual to regard others with respect and dignity. In this sense, it is "Categorical" in that it is universal and it is an "Imperative" in that is a moral requirement. As will be discussed below under the heading of objections to the argument, thought this moral sense may vary from one individual to the next, or from one socio-cultural context to the other, there still exists an abiding and universal sense of how one "ought" to live and how one "should" achieve a greater level of morality.
Objections: The objections to the Moral Argument for God's existence consist of the following.
1) Critics advance that human moral consciousness can result from conditioned response. The deterministic perspective concerning human moral consciousness is best seen in the theoretical proposal of behaviorist Determinism by B. F. Skinner. Skinner contends that any concept of human freedom or the autonomous individuals should be regarded as "fiction." (Stanley Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 153). In addition to Skinnerian Behaviorism a more recent development of the deterministic model of human behavior and moral awareness is advanced under the title of sociobiology, which understands human behavior in terms of ethology, ecology and genetics. According to the sociobiological model, these elements merge with the consequence of eliminating any possibility of human freedom and attributing all human behavior, including moral sense, to little more than "genetic selfishness". (Stanley Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 154; E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature, 16-17; Robert Wallace, The Genetic Factor, 17; Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene)
2) Critics also contend that human moral standards, though universal (or at least it appearing to be so), are subjective in nature. Jean Paul Sartre (1905-80), the French Existentialist, contended that to speak of a universal standard of morality is meaningless. According to Sartre, "the world is devoid of any objective meaning or value" and so-called "human meaning" has as its derivation in nothing more than the individual's commitments and choices. In short, the individuals shape his moral understanding and ultimately his destiny in the exercise of human freedom demonstrated in personal decisions. ( Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 36; Jean Paul Sartre, "Existentialism" in Existentialism and Human Emotions, trans. Bernard Frechtman, 15) Bertrand Russell counters the Moral Argument with his contention that one's morality is essentially nothing more than a bundle of one's own perceptions and preferences. (Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 36; Bertrand Russell and F. C. Coppleston, "The Existence of God: A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father F. C. Coppleston," in Bertrand Russell, On God and Religion, ed. Al Sekel, 123-46.
3) Finally, those who challenge Kant's moral argument contend that, even if one accepts the premise of the existence of a universal sense of morality, this conclusion does not necessitate the existence of deity. As with other arguments previously cited, critics contend that Kant's moral argument makes an irrational leap from morality to the consequent required existence of God.
The argument was presented by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant argued that the existence of God must be assumed by the individual since without God's existence there would be no immortality of the soul or any meaningful opportunity to fulfill the moral requirements of the Categorical Imperative proposed by him. In short, Kant summarized this sense of morality as an innate awareness of the individual to regard others with respect and dignity. In this sense, it is "Categorical" in that it is universal and it is an "Imperative" in that is a moral requirement. As will be discussed below under the heading of objections to the argument, thought this moral sense may vary from one individual to the next, or from one socio-cultural context to the other, there still exists an abiding and universal sense of how one "ought" to live and how one "should" achieve a greater level of morality.
Objections: The objections to the Moral Argument for God's existence consist of the following.
1) Critics advance that human moral consciousness can result from conditioned response. The deterministic perspective concerning human moral consciousness is best seen in the theoretical proposal of behaviorist Determinism by B. F. Skinner. Skinner contends that any concept of human freedom or the autonomous individuals should be regarded as "fiction." (Stanley Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 153). In addition to Skinnerian Behaviorism a more recent development of the deterministic model of human behavior and moral awareness is advanced under the title of sociobiology, which understands human behavior in terms of ethology, ecology and genetics. According to the sociobiological model, these elements merge with the consequence of eliminating any possibility of human freedom and attributing all human behavior, including moral sense, to little more than "genetic selfishness". (Stanley Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 154; E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature, 16-17; Robert Wallace, The Genetic Factor, 17; Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene)
2) Critics also contend that human moral standards, though universal (or at least it appearing to be so), are subjective in nature. Jean Paul Sartre (1905-80), the French Existentialist, contended that to speak of a universal standard of morality is meaningless. According to Sartre, "the world is devoid of any objective meaning or value" and so-called "human meaning" has as its derivation in nothing more than the individual's commitments and choices. In short, the individuals shape his moral understanding and ultimately his destiny in the exercise of human freedom demonstrated in personal decisions. ( Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 36; Jean Paul Sartre, "Existentialism" in Existentialism and Human Emotions, trans. Bernard Frechtman, 15) Bertrand Russell counters the Moral Argument with his contention that one's morality is essentially nothing more than a bundle of one's own perceptions and preferences. (Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 36; Bertrand Russell and F. C. Coppleston, "The Existence of God: A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father F. C. Coppleston," in Bertrand Russell, On God and Religion, ed. Al Sekel, 123-46.
3) Finally, those who challenge Kant's moral argument contend that, even if one accepts the premise of the existence of a universal sense of morality, this conclusion does not necessitate the existence of deity. As with other arguments previously cited, critics contend that Kant's moral argument makes an irrational leap from morality to the consequent required existence of God.
The Ontological Argument
Perhaps the most "beautiful" and philosophically appealing of all the rational arguments is the Ontological Argument. The argument contends first that the term "God" evokes the idea of the greatest conceivable being possible. In short, God by definition is the "unsurpassable one." A necessary being surpasses one who is not necessary. Therefore, "God" must exist. The argument centers upon the concept of God as the "unsurpassable" one. As such, God is perfect. "Perfection" requires both conception and existence. For God not to exist would make God less than perfect. Therefore, God must exist. To conceive of God as "perfect" and not existing would be self-contradictory. Consequently, God's existence is required by definition.
The argument was proposed by Saint Anselm (1033-1109). Anselm's purpose in constructing the argument lay not in the demonstration of God's existence but in an attempt to establish that all "rational creatures" will conclude that God exists from the very idea or concept of "God." Whereas his successor, Aquinas, built his system upon the work of Aristotle, Anselm established his system upon the teaching of Aristotle's teacher, Plato. Anselm therefore drew from Plato's apriori epistemology whereas it will be remembered that Aristotle's argument was aposteriori. In addition, Anselm was thoroughly influenced by the work of Augustine (354-430) who was influenced by the Neo-Platonist St. Ambrose under whose influence Augustine was converted to Christian faith. Aquinas rejected the Ontological argument since in his view it constituted a violation of inductive logic (Aristotle). Consequently, the Ontological argument has been generally disregarded by Catholic theology and philosophy as methodologically inadequate.
Objection: The ontological argument, while appealing and even containing a great degree of philosophic beauty and appeal is not without weaknesses.
1) The first criticism of the Ontological argument addresses the first premise of Anselm's argument, namely that God is by definition the greatest conceivable being one can imagine. Critics contend that this premise from the start assumes God's existence. It should be said that it appears that there may be validity to this criticism and that this objection is contained in Anselm's intention for the argument in that Anselm believed that the existence of God is in reality a "given" in our self -conscious experience. (Newport, Ultimate Questions, 450)
2) The second criticism addresses the second premise of the ontological argument, which, according to the objection, makes the leap from concept to existence. Anselm's contemporary Gaunilo countered the argument by proposing that that an idea in the mind must also have its counterpart in reality. Concept does not require or necessitate existence. For instance, one can posit the idea of the perfect island. On this island the weather is always the perfect temperature, never too hot, never too cold. On this island, the breeze is always perfect, the Margarita's (or the Captain and coke, whichever is your preference; after all, the island is perfect) are always blended to perfection, the appearance of the opposite sex is perfectly appealing and the water is perfectly beautiful. However, to conceive of such an island does not necessitate its existence. Anselm's counter proposal was that while Gaunilo's argument possessed validity, Anselm's argument was never intended to validate the existence of all concepts with the quality of existence but only of one object, that of God.
3) Finally, to accept the conclusion of the Ontological Argument still tells us nothing about the nature of the "God" whose existence has been proven by the argument.
The Cosmological Argument
The Cosmological Argument is essentially an argument from "cause and effect." The premises of the argument consist of the following: Every effect has a cause. Therefore, there exists the universality of causation or the universal law of causation. Second, there cannot be an infinite regression of causes. In other words, there must be a point of beginning. Cause and effect cannot continue into the past with no point of origin. As a result, this necessitates a "Prime Mover" or "First Cause."
The Cosmological Argument finds classical expression in the work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-74). Aquinas' thought reflected his adoption of Aristotelian philosophy, especially with regard to the concept of cause and effect. Aristotle's epistemologic conclusions were based upon observation or aposteriori knowledge. According to Aristotle every movement or change implies a mover. This chain of events cannot be infinite however. Therefore, there must be an Unmoved Mover or a Prime Mover. In addition, however, Aristotle also argued that since motion is eternal, since time is eternal and time is the measure of motion, the Prime Mover must also be eternal. In short, physical theory requires an Eternal Unmoved Mover. Aquinas', church theologian, simply "baptized" the thought of Aristotle so to speak and transformed Aristotle's philosophy into Christian theology.
Objections: A number of objections have been proposed regarding the Cosmological Argument.
1) One objection to the argument lies in its self-contradictory propositions. On the one hand, the argument proposes that there is no "uncaused Cause". However and conversely, the argument concludes that there is just such an "uncaused Cause" which is the First Cause or Prime Mover of the universe. Thus, the argument contradicts itself.
2) A second objection to the argument centers in the second premise, which contends that there cannot be an infinite number of regressions into the past. However, this contention appears to be logically problematic since critics point out that there is a possibility for an infinite progression so why is there not conversely the possibility of infinite regression?
3) David Hume, the father of modern skeptical thought, also challenged the Cosmological (as well as the Teleological) argument. Hume argued that no being exists "necessarily" including "God." In addition, Hume also proposed the "Fallacy of Composition" as a challenge to the Cosmological Argument in which he countered that while it is possible to advance the idea that "God" may gave created or "composed" a portion of the created order, but it is not logically required that "God" created the whole or entirety of that which exists.
4) Finally, as with the other rational arguments, to agree with the conclusion of the argument that there is a Prime Mover of the Universe, tells us nothing of the nature of that Prime Mover. In short, we still do not know what "He", "She", or "It" is like. In this sense the argument is incomplete at the least.
10.10.08
The Watchmaker
The Teleological Argument
The Teleological Argument is more simply known as the argument from Design. It essentially consists of the following premises: the universe shows extensive evidence of purpose and design. This quality of purpose and design that one witnesses in the universe is not present by accident or chance. Therefore, there must be a Divine Designer of the Cosmos. In short, the presence of order in the design of the universe requires that rationality lead us to conclude the existence of a Divine Designer.
The Argument found popular expression in William Paley’s (1743-1805) Analogy of the Watchmaker. Paley hypothesized that one day you are walking across your lawn only to look down and find for the first time a watch. Perplexed and intrigued, you pick up the watch to examine it more closely. You look at the watch face and see the hands moving in synchronization with one another. Still inquisitive, you examine the backside of the watch, removing the cover to find a number of cogs of varying shapes and sizes working together in perfect harmony in order to keep time. Paley posits the logical leap that because there is such a watch with intricate design, it could not have popped into existence by chance. Rather, the existence of design in the watch requires that there be a watchmaker. In Paley’s day the natural conclusion was therefore that there must be a Divine Designer who has orchestrated the order and design of the cosmos.
Objections: The Teleological Argument is not without flaw however. The following objections have been proposed as challenges to the legitimacy of the Argument.
1) Premise one, that there is evidence of purpose and design in the universe, is challenged by the reality that this is not always so. Just as there are what are termed “Teleological” elements (elements of order) in the universe, there are “Dysteleological” elements (evidences of disorder) as well. These break down into two classical categories: Natural Evil and Moral Evil. Natural Evil consists of things such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods for example. Moral Evil is demonstrated in realities such as murder, rape and other acts of inhumanity performed by one’s fellow humans. If we attribute order to “Him” or “It” or “Her” do we not also have to attribute disorder to “Him” or “It” or “Her”?
2) Premise two, that this purpose and design in the cosmos did not happen by accident, is challenged by the fact that today we have other possible explanations of this order rather than just a Divine Designer. Paley’s argument was pre-Darwinian. There was no other explanation of the origin of this perceived order and purpose in the universe beyond God. However, this is no longer the case. With Darwin and his theory of natural selection, there appeared on the scene an alternative explanation of the source of cosmic order and design. Whether the individual endorses this view or not is beside the point. What matters is that Natural Selection does in provide an alternative interpretation of the source of design and purpose in the universe.
3) Premise three, that there must be a Divine Designer as a logical requirement of this order and purpose, is also flawed. Yet it is flawed in another fashion. If we grant the potential existence of the Divine Designer for the sake of argument then what does this tells us about the nature of the Divine Designer? What is “He” or “She” or “It” like? The argument fails to give us much information about the nature of this Metaphysical entity. Consequently, those with a religious agenda attached to rationally legitimating the belief in Theism had better beware.
The Gardener
“God and the Garden”
One particularly intriguing attempt to address the epistemic question of God’s existence or non existence is found in Wisdom’s parable of the garden. (John Wisdom, “God,” Essays in Logic and Language, ed. Anthony Flew, Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, 1951, p. 71)
After being absent two individuals return to their long neglected garden only to discover that there area few rather stubborn plants which have refused to relinquish their ground to the onslaught of ever increasing weeds, which as weeds will do, are flourishing in the garden. The two begin talking between themselves about the phenomenon taking place in the garden.
One proposes that a gardener has been working the garden and “doing something” about the plants. After asking however they are told that no one has seen anyone at work in their garden. Each raises her eyebrows and glances once again at the garden. Tis a puzzlement.
One proposes that a “mystery gardener” must have worked while the neighbors slept. Her partner responds that surely someone would have heard him and argues further that anyone who genuinely cared about the plants would have at least controlled the presence of the weeds in the garden. Each scratches her head. Tis a puzzlement.
Not to be out done by her partner’s contraindications, she tries again. She proposes that surely the way the garden is arranged reveals a purpose and beauty in the garden. She contends that an “invisible someone” must be keeping the garden. She then proceeds to investigate for further evidence of the “invisible gardener” only to find that there is evidence both for and against such a possibility. Tis still a puzzlement.
Refusing to give up, the two gardeners decide that they will investigate what happens to other gardens which are left without attention by any gardener. Upon investigation there is still no conclusive evidence. Tis still a puzzlement.
The short of it all is that in the end one concludes there must be a gardener who cares for the garden while the other determines that there must not be such a caretaker. There is no difference in what they have seen, no difference in what they have heard. Based on the same evidence, both arrive at radically different conclusions.
Such is the issue of knowledge of God. Different individuals will have divergent interpretations and radically opposing conclusions.
Objections:
Which is the best argument in favor of the “Gardener’s” existence?
Which is the best argument against the “Gardener’s” existence?
What do the insights and conclusions tell us about epistemologic conclusions in general?
What do the insights and conclusions tell us about epistemologic conclusions regarding one’s own ontological conclusions based on religious presuppositions?
One particularly intriguing attempt to address the epistemic question of God’s existence or non existence is found in Wisdom’s parable of the garden. (John Wisdom, “God,” Essays in Logic and Language, ed. Anthony Flew, Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, 1951, p. 71)
After being absent two individuals return to their long neglected garden only to discover that there area few rather stubborn plants which have refused to relinquish their ground to the onslaught of ever increasing weeds, which as weeds will do, are flourishing in the garden. The two begin talking between themselves about the phenomenon taking place in the garden.
One proposes that a gardener has been working the garden and “doing something” about the plants. After asking however they are told that no one has seen anyone at work in their garden. Each raises her eyebrows and glances once again at the garden. Tis a puzzlement.
One proposes that a “mystery gardener” must have worked while the neighbors slept. Her partner responds that surely someone would have heard him and argues further that anyone who genuinely cared about the plants would have at least controlled the presence of the weeds in the garden. Each scratches her head. Tis a puzzlement.
Not to be out done by her partner’s contraindications, she tries again. She proposes that surely the way the garden is arranged reveals a purpose and beauty in the garden. She contends that an “invisible someone” must be keeping the garden. She then proceeds to investigate for further evidence of the “invisible gardener” only to find that there is evidence both for and against such a possibility. Tis still a puzzlement.
Refusing to give up, the two gardeners decide that they will investigate what happens to other gardens which are left without attention by any gardener. Upon investigation there is still no conclusive evidence. Tis still a puzzlement.
The short of it all is that in the end one concludes there must be a gardener who cares for the garden while the other determines that there must not be such a caretaker. There is no difference in what they have seen, no difference in what they have heard. Based on the same evidence, both arrive at radically different conclusions.
Such is the issue of knowledge of God. Different individuals will have divergent interpretations and radically opposing conclusions.
Objections:
Which is the best argument in favor of the “Gardener’s” existence?
Which is the best argument against the “Gardener’s” existence?
What do the insights and conclusions tell us about epistemologic conclusions in general?
What do the insights and conclusions tell us about epistemologic conclusions regarding one’s own ontological conclusions based on religious presuppositions?
9.10.08
Metaphysics
It seems that there is an inevitable relationship between epistemology and metaphysics or ontology. Whenever we are striving to "know" (epistemology) such efforts “to know” always take place within the framework of metaphysics or ontology. After all, that is what we are attempting to "know." However, metaphysical reality, at least in certain circles, is unchanging but epistemological understanding is not so.
For example, while it is true that "Truth" does not change between the ages of 22 and 52, it is true that my life context does change and what I "know" of that Truth is very different at 52 than what I knew of that Truth at 22. To fail to recognize this evidences a lack of personal insight and self-reflection.
Consequently, it is my contention that I must have a sense of epistemological humility regarding my knowledge of that Metaphysical Reality or Truth. With regard to the relationship between metaphysics and epistemology, Paul Tillich, an ontological theologian comments that every epistemological assertion is essentially or at least implicitly ontological.
There is also an experiential or pragmatic basis for the necessity of ontological categories. In other words while many would contend that a Philosophic discussion of Metaphysics is esoteric that simply is not true. The discussion of Metaphysics and Ontological Reality has some very practical implications, not the least of which is the fact that as "creatures" we are unable to be satisfied with merely functional or fragmentary interpretation of our experience.
Again Paul Tillich advanced that our dissatisfaction with the failed expectations of this life and the lack of purpose, significance, or meaning, which this life gives, drives us, or propels us to search for a higher meaning and significance. Consequently books like Rick Warren's the Purpose Driven Life are sold by the millions (regardless of a lack of Theological Profundity or even correctness).
In each human there is a quest for purpose. This quest inevitably leads to Metaphysical investigations. Again at the risk of being overly pragmatic, a sermon and even a church should strive to help people in search of a Metaphysic, though we could never say it in that fashion to the lay people.
In addition, another contributor to Metaphysical search and quests lies in the reality that we tend to believe that there is a rational cohesion and order to the universe and our environment. Consequently T. F. Torrance contends that in our quest for metaphysical understanding not only are we dependent upon the intelligibility of the cosmos but we in the very reality that we are willing to engage in the question we assume the intelligibility of the cosmos and that it contains a Metaphysic that we can grasp. In essence, the Metaphysical quest is amazingly optimistic and hopeful.
We live in a culture that generally has no regard for biblical texts. Consequently, the church is going to have to learn how to connect with culture based upon Philosophic categories and not just biblical texts. That is hard for the Biblicist to hear, but it is nonetheless true. Yet this is not the first time in Christian history that this has been the case. We seem to have forgotten that the apostolic church had to connect with its own pagan culture without the benefit of the canon of the New Testament. We are simply being asked by Providence to do the same today. Unfortunately, we have been so spoiled in past decades by living in a culture that at least (under modernism) accepted to some extent the authority of scripture, that we have completely misread our contemporary culture (postmodern) and are still trying the approach that seemed to work in the time of modernism.
I frequently tell my students that while we believe in the text of the New Testament, we have failed to see that our culture no longer does so if it ever really did. Consequently, that cannot be the primary or initial connecting point any longer. As I think about it, this is increasingly true of the church, since most it seems can no longer even find the preacher sermon text on Sunday morning because they are so biblically illiterate. I contend that this is partly because we have through the use of technology eliminated the need for people even to bring their Bibles to church, and even more so have projected the texts onto the screen so that even if they have their bible, they no longer need to look up the text for themselves.
Questions:
1) Taking the three points stated above and basing your response upon Philosophic constructs what might these three realities tell us about the content of a Christian metaphysic?
2) How might these three points provide some kind of connecting point for communicating the Christian faith to others?
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