1. The Problem of Abstraction. As stated in the objections to each of the above arguments, each fails to tell us anything of the nature of the deity whose existence is rationally propped up. This will be elaborated upon later in this list. 2. The Problem of Detachment. The above stated rational arguments also remove the rationally pursued "Deity" from one's life context or experience. Divinity is thereby not only an abstraction, but also a remote or removed abstraction.
3. The Problem of Inverse Proportionality. Of all the challenges this seems at least for this writer the most difficult to get one's mind around. It is proposed that the arguments have a paradoxical nature. A greater concept of "perfection" it is argued leads to a diminished need for a perfect deity. A greater understanding of the "design" of the universe inversely leads to the diminished need for a grand "Designer." (Woodfin, With All Your Mind, 48)
4. The Problem of Analogy. Analogical arguments attempt to take the facts as related to one dimension and apply them to another. In this "crossing over" lies the Problem of Analogy. While the problem is inherent in all linguistic efforts, after all language is all symbolic or analogical by its very nature, it seems especially to be present with regard to the rational arguments. For instance, how can we take the understanding, which we have of the "watch" which leads to the need for a "watch maker" and apply that on a much more grand scale to the Divine, or Cosmic Watchmaker designing the universe?
5. The Problem of Probability. Philosophers state the problem as "the problem of theism and probability." (Woodfin, With All Your Mind, 49) The above stated arguments are presented in reference to this one known universe, but at the same time the arguments attempt to argue how much better this universe is as created by the Divine in contrast to one not created by the Divine.
6. The Problem of Frame of Reference. The above presented objections by Gaunilon to the Ontological Argument demonstrate just such a problem. It will be remembered that, in response to Anselm's contention that the concept of perfection requires existence, Gaunilon countered that this logic necessitates the existence of the perfect Island of which one can conceive. Anselm counter-responded that the contention is only true of the concept of God, not all conceptions. Bertrand Russell also responds to this challenge when he argues and hypothesizes the following: Suppose the observance of a pair of scales. There are ten ounces on one side. Those ten ounces are outweighed by something on the other side of the scale. We do not know nor can we observe what that "something" is. Hume grants that the observer may legitimately assume that the unseen object weighs more than the ten ounce item. However, Hume contends that it could never be concluded that the unseen amount weighs one hundred ounces for instance and, even more so, one could never conclude that the unseen amount contains the weight of infinity. (David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 40)
7. The Problem of Unity. How can one be assured that of the above presented arguments, each point to the same "God?" The arguments might be interpreted as a basis for "polytheism" rather than "monotheism."
8. The Problem of the Impersonal. Again, what is this "Divinity" whose existence is "proven" like? Is he a perfect being? Is he a Cosmic Cause? Is he a Carpenter-like Designer or an Engineer-like Enigma? What is he like? We simply cannot know.
It is likely at this point that the wide eyed optimistic Christian theist proudly, naively, perhaps even pompously, pops up and states that he can "fill in the blank for each of these objections." Really?
While this is difficult for many within the Christian Theistic context to admit to themselves, even more so to others, their approach is at least as problematic, if not more so. It might even be argued that their ontologic perspective is perhaps even more fraught with difficulty by virtue of the attempt to prove that "God" is personal. How do we arrive at this conclusion regarding the nature of deity without the benefit of revelation? How does one verify another's revelation, especially with regard to the nature of God? How does one arrive at the conclusion that God is a personal God who deeply desires a relationship with humanity without the benefit of belief in a special revelation of that truth through the religious text in the person of "Jesus" who allegedly himself claimed to be the interpretive clue (Woodfin) to the Divine and all of reality?
In fact, it should be noted that British empiricism emerged in reaction to the British claim of revelation, which in turn gave birth to the concept of the "divine right of kings". How does one counter the king's argument that he or she has a divine right to certain levels of authority when the basis for the doctrine of the "divine right of kings" is one's revelation from God? Does one simply counter, “God told me this” in response to another’s contention, “God told me that”?
In short, how does one challenge the legitimacy of another's revelation? It is not just the claim to authoritative reason, which has led to movements laced with lunacy. So it seems that at least some of the above stated limitations, if not many of the limitations, and perhaps all of them, are even more pronounced for the Christian Theist who takes the understanding of this metaphysical reality called "God" even further than do the rational arguments. In other words, the authoritative claim rooted in revelation leads to a more complicated dilemma than the authoritative claim based in reason.
