1.12.08
Metaethics
Metaethics may be understood as “the study of concepts, methods of justification and ontological assumptions in the field of ethics proper.” (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, “Ethics”, 287-88)
The field of metaethics has a connection to epistemological concerns (how can we know the right thing to do?) and also has a connection to metaphysical interpretations such as what is the nature or character of that which is right or wrong (what is the nature of reality and how does that impact one’s behavior?)
The field of metaethics from the epistemological perspective contains three distinctive perspectives regarding the epistemological dimension of the ethical task. These are naturalism, cognitivism (rationalism) and non-cognitivism.
Naturalism carries out the task of ethical contemplation and action with the under the direction of the natural sciences.
Non-cognitivism addresses ethical matters in a qualified sense, advancing the idea that ethical statements are not really meaningful at all. Rather, ethical statements are “non cognitivist” in nature, cannot be verified as right or wrong, and are ultimately only emotive utterances of approval or disapproval.
Cognitivism or the rationalist approach, on the other hand, addresses ethical concerns on an a priori basis. According to this view, issues of right and wrong, moral and immoral are discerned through the use of rationality without any regard for empirical considerations or sensory input.
The field of metaethics from the metaphysical perspective focuses upon the question of objectivity. Two perspectives dominate this metaphysical approach concerning the question of ethical objectivity.
The first metaphysical perspective is ethical realism. According to this approach, ethical values, standards, and realities have their basis in objective realities and are therefore, ultimately universalizable. This approach is best characterized in the Platonic idea of the world of Forms.
The second metaphysical perspective is ethical subjectivism which advocates that ethical statements and concerns are in reality subjective and in some extreme instances reflect no more than the projections of one’s own mood, disposition, or emotion onto a given context. This approach is best reflected in the ethical skepticism of David Hume and ethical existentialism of Jean Paul Satre.