19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

B. Types of Sciences and Their Relations

a. Psychology and sociology are inductive sciences, i.e their laws are derived through
observation and experiment; ethology is a deductive science, i.e. its laws are derived logically from the laws of another science, viz. psychology.

b. Although empirical laws are quire useful in common life they are not really reliable until they are understood through universal laws, which causally explain them. According to Mill, “Unless we have resolved the empirical law into the laws of the causes on which it depends and ascertained that those causes extend to the case which we have in view, there can be no reliance placed in our inferences.” Hence, the empirical laws of sociology must be explained through ethology, they are to be reliable.

c. Although empirical laws of sociology must be derived from laws which explain them in order to be something more than approximate generalizations, the fact that they are formulated through observation or experiment makes possible their providing empirical tests of any deductive derivations.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

VI. Philosophy of Social Science (from A System of Logic)

A. Definitions

“The subject, then, of psychology is the uniformities of succession, the laws, whether ultimate or derivative, according to which one mental state succeeds another.”

“Ethology” is the science that determines the kinds of character produced in conformity with the laws of psychology.

A state of society “is the simultaneous state of all the greater social facts or phenomena. Such are: the degree of knowledge and of intellectual and moral culture existing in the community and in every class of it; the state of industry of wealth and its distribution; the habitual occupations of the community, heir division into classes and the relations of those classes to one another; the common beliefs which they entertain on all the subjects most important to mankind and the degree of assurance with which those beliefs are held; their tastes, and the character and degree of their aesthetic development; their form of government and the more important of their laws and customs.”

“An empirical law . . . . is a uniformity, whether of succession or of coexistence, which holds true in all instances within our limits of observation but is not of a nature to afford any assurance it would hold beyond those limits.” A universal law is exactly true and capable of being a principle in a causal explanation.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

B. Induction

1. Definition: All reasoned knowledge is based upon induction, so induction is fundamentally important.

2. The Ground of Induction:

The fundamental axiom, or ground, of induction is the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature: “an assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order of the universe, namely, that there are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what happens once will, under s sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen again and not only again, but as often as the same circumstances recur.” (Bk III, ch. III). The principle is the ultimate major premise of every induction. Although nature is uniform, it is also “infinitely various.” This leads to problem with respect to induction, such as the mistaken view once held by Europeans, “All swans are white.” The variety along with our limited experience creates the problem of induction, whereby we have difficulty determining why and when induction can be relied upon.

3. Scientific Induction

The popular inductions usually based upon induction by simple enumeration and often-unreliable need to be replaced by scientific induction. Scientific induction gives a great precision and accuracy to the process of collecting and improving inductions through further experience. The simplest expressions of uniformities in nature, those upon which other uniformities rest, become the laws of nature in science. Observed uniformities that have not yet been resolved into, or derived from, simpler laws are empirical laws. They are acceptable as true only within the limits of the experience that establishes them. That is, they get no additional support that would come from showing how they can be explained, or derived from laws of nature.

4. Law of Universal Causation

“ . . . . invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it . . . “ or “ the law that every consequent has an invariable antecedent.” (Bk. III, ch. V) The Law of Universal Causation provides a way of explaining the principle of the uniformity of nature and thereby proves an ultimate justification of induction. The truth of the Law is based upon experience rather than self evidence, the structure of the mind, or a mere disposition to believe. Evidence for the law of Universal Causations consists of:

a. Although the evidence is based on a wide range of more specialized inductions, the totality is co extensive with the whole of human experience.

b. Although induction by simple enumeration is often unreliable, it becomes reliable with respect to the Law of Universal Causation (as is also the case with respect to laws of number and geometry) just because of the enormously wide range of inductions that support the Law.

c. Evidence directly shows that the Law is true for “far the greatest number of phenomena” and there is no evidence of its being untrue.

d. As our knowledge increases, more and more phenomena fall under the law.

e. Even when some phenomena elude the attempt to bring them under the Law, we find that parts of the phenomena do come under the Law, for example, in the case of the wind.

While we have every reason to accept the truth of the Law of Universal Causation, “the reasons for this reliance do not hold in circumstances unknown to us, and beyond the possible range of our experience. In distant parts of the stellar regions, where the phenomena may be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted, it would be folly to affirm confidently that this genera law prevails . . .. “ (Bk III. Ch. XXI, Par. 4) This qualification seems to be aptly applicable to the world of quantum physics, where universal causation is denied.

5. Methods of Experimental Inquiry

Agreement, Difference, Joint Method of Agreement and Difference, Residues, and Concomitant Variation: These methods are fundamental in providing the precision and accuracy needed for scientific induction.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

V. Logic and Knowledge (From Mills work System of Logic)

A. Deduction: (inference from general to particular)

1. Definition:

All deductive or demonstrative sciences are inductive and are based on experience. The

2. The Syllogism

Syllogism contains the major premise as an inductive generalization. For instance, in the syllogism,

P1 All human beings are mortal.
P2. Socrates is a human being.
Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

The conclusion is presumed in the first premise since we cannot say that “All human beings are mortal” unless we are already convinced of the mortality of each individual man including Socrates.

A general statement, such as “All human beings are mortal” is just a rule, like a memorandum that summarizes what we know of individuals; so a general statement is really about individuals and we infer from the general to the particular in a syllogism. IN a syllogism then we do not really infer from a general to a particular, but we interpret the general rule in the major premise to make sure that it is applied correctly. The syllogism still has value however because arguing from a “general principle presents a larger object to the imagination than individual statements” and provides a superior means of testing a claim by pointing out conclusions to be examined. Mill does not make the distinction between “validity” and “soundness common in present day logic.

3. Geometry

The points, lines, circles, and squares of geometry are copies of the imperfect or approximate points, lines circles, and squares we encounter in our experience e. The points, lines, circles, and squares we encounter in our experience. The points, lines, circles, square, and axioms of geometry are not a priori necessary truths based upon definitions or else some separate realm of concepts; rather they are experiential, or experimental, truths and should be regarded as approximations. Since we can explain geometry quite well as being based upon experience, the burden of proof here rests with anyone who wants to claim otherwise. The “necessity” of geometry cannot be based on the view which is held by some that any other axioms are inconceivable since there is a long history of the rejection of prior claims about inconceivability as knowledge increased.

4. Arithmetic and Algebra.
There is no separate realm of abstract numbers because we always encounter numbers in experience associated with objects. That is, we do not experience the number 10 but rather 10 books, 10 pencils, 10 miles, etc. We jus think we are dealing with a separate, abstract number because we can associate a given number with a variety of different objects. The fundamental truths of number are based upon early and constant experiences and are thus inductive generalizations.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

I. Best Form of Government (from Considerations on Representative Government)

Some accommodation is necessary for different circumstances. Ideally, representative democracy is the best form of government according to Mill. By encouraging the fullest possible participation by all citizens, representative democracy best accomplishes the fundamental task of the state, namely to organize and use the moral, intellectual, and practical abilities of the citizenry to serve the public good in the present and to promote advancement of these abilities in the future. The submissive citizenry characteristic of a despotic government does not insure that everyone’s interests will be taken into account and offers little hope that the moral, intellectual, and practical abilities of everyone will be utilized and developed.

There is no Rousseau-like optimism about people’s natural abilities and wisdom in Mill’s conclusions. (See Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government, especially chs. III-VII).

1. He worries about the tyranny of majorities over minorities and favors proportionate representation.
2. He advocates measures such as literacy tests for voting and granting of additional votes to the educated over the uneducated.
3. He takes the position that some people, due to lack of motivation or ability, are not ready for representative democracy.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

H. Legitimate Governmental Activity and Interference (from On Liberty and Principles of Political Economy)

Based upon the principle of avoiding harm-to-others or the claim that individuals are not always the best judges of their own interests there are legitimate governmental interferences. These include the catalogue of limitations and exceptions with respect to individuals freedoms already stated previously and the additional examples of:

1. Governmental regulation of commerce and trade.

2. Requirements for waning labels on dangerous substances such as poisons.

3. Registration of the sale of articles well suited for criminal purposes, such as burglary tools and firearms perhaps.

4. Prohibitions against public indecency.

5. Prohibition or regulation of public houses for gambling, drinking, or prostitution.

6. Taxation to assure governmental revenues.

7. Heavier taxation on items such as alcohol to discourage its immoderate use.

8. Required education of children.

9. Prohibitions on marriage when a couple cannot show that they have the means of supporting a family and the nation suffers from overpopulation.

10. Laws regulating contracts and property.

11. Enforcement of laws through the judiciary and police.

12. Regulations regarding the use of natural resources and use of public lands and waters.

13. Restrictions regarding the numbers of hours in a workday.

14. Establishment of a stable system of public welfare for the needy.

15. Governmental performance of public services such as geographical or scientific exploration when individuals are unlikely to undertake such activities.

Regarding the general function of government he writes:

“It may be said generally, that anything which it is desirable should be done for the general interests of mankind of future generations, or for the present interests of those members o the community who require external aid, but which is not of a nature to remunerate individuals or associations for undertaking it, is in itself a suitable thing to be undertaken by government: though before making the work their own, governments ought always to consider if there be any rational probability of its being done on what is called the voluntary principle, and if so, whether it is likely to be done in a better of more effectual manner by government agency, than by the zeal and liberality of individuals. (PPE). Therefore while Mill supports individualism and individual freedoms, he recognizes numerous occasions where governmental or societal interference, punishment, regulation and assistance are justified.

When government assists individuals, for example, through public education, there must be clear evidence that the activities government supports are unlikely to be done by individuals themselves.

There are certain dangers related to governmental interference according to Mill, however:

1. Generally, individuals do a better job of accomplishing tasks than government.

2. Even when government can do a better job, there are advantages in the long run to granting individuals the practical experience of doing things for themselves.

3. There is the ever- present danger of accumulating government power, especially when government attracts to itself the most talented and ambitious persons as the primary means of their social advancement. In other words, governmental monopoly of talent and ambition, aside from dangers of despotism, establishes a bureaucracy not easily criticized by common citizens and not easily reformed even by the most innovative political leaders. Mill is not optimistic about the prospects of a free press and elected legislature maintaining adequate constraints on a giant bureaucracy.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

G. Exceptions to Individual Freedom (From On Liberty and Principles of Political Economy)
While we may ordinarily presume that individuals are their own best judges of their best interests, this presumption does not hold for children, the mentally ill, and the mentally deficient. There can be some societies so backward and barbarous as to be incapable of benefiting from individual freedom in which case despotism is suitable for them at least until they achieve a higher level of development. A more advanced society, in its relations with these backward ones, has an obligation to foster those conditions allowing for eventually assumption of individual freedoms by the persons in these “backward” societies.

Another exception to the granting of individual freedom occurs when a person uses this freedom to become a slave for “the principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free.”

An exception may be made where someone enters freely into an irrevocable contract at a time when it may not be possible to foresee the consequences in the distant future clearly. In Principles of Political Economy, he says:

The practical maxim of leaving contracts free, is not applicable without great limitations in case of engagements in perpetuity; and the law should be extremely jealous of such engagements; should refuse its sanction to them when the obligations they impose are such as the contracting party cannot be a competent judge of, if it ever does sanction them, it should take possible security for their being contracted with foresight and deliberation; and in compensation for not permitting the parties themselves to revoke their engagement, should grant them a release from it, on a sufficient case being made out before an impartial authority. These considerations are eminently applicable to marriage, the most import of all cases of engagement for life.”

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

F. Limitations on Freedom (From On Liberty and Principles of Political Economy)

We are not to harm others in the process of expressing our freedom.

1. We are not free to lie, murder, rape or steal.

2. Drunkenness, idleness, gambling, and fornication cease to be self-regarding actions if we have distinct obligations toward others, for example toward members of our family or toward an employer. Whenever, through express promises or conduct, we create expectations and calculations seriously affecting the lives of others, we are subsequently obligated to take their interests into account and must not regard what we then do as self-regarding actions.

3. We are obligated to avoid actions by which we would clearly become a burden to others.

4. Where we enjoy societies protection, we cannot on the grounds of “individual freedom” evade out social obligations, such as contributing to the common defense or testifying in court.

5. We are obligated to avoid harm to others by coming to the aid of the defenseless and by saving the lives of those in danger, unless we have reason to believe that some greater harm would ensue from our engaging in such actions.

6. The principle of avoidance0of-harm-to-others also applies to cases where we may presume to act in others’ behalf on the grounds that their interests are identical with our own. On this point, Mill specifically mentions dominance over wives and children as instances where there may be an unwarranted claim to individual freedom.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

E. Freedom of Association

These justifications for individual freedom of action apply equally well for freedom of association, whereby we join with others in common pursuits. So long as no harm to others occurs and the union involves no force or deceit, we should regard freedom of association as simply an extension of our individual freedom of action.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

D. Freedom of Action (On Liberty, ch. III)
It entails our being able to act according to our own inclinations and judgments, without hindrance from others, so long as we act at our own risk and period. People should have he freedom to plan their lives so as to suit their own character. He denies society or other persons the right to interfere even when we engage in publicly disreputable activities as drunkenness, gambling, idleness, and fornication, provided, of course, that we do not harm others in the process. Society benefits by allowing individuals to experiment with different ways of living so as to test them in practice:

“The initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from someone individual. The honor and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open.”

Freedom of action fosters development of all our human capacities, including creativity and character, so as to improve the individual as well as society at large:

“It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it, and calling it forth within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there I more in the mass which is composed of them.”

Given the many differences in tastes among human beings, their happiness requires tolerance for individual differences in actions.

“The only unfailing and permanent source” of progress or improvement in human existence, as is evident from observation of different societies, resides in the freedom to pursue different paths, to challenge various customs, and to be innovative. Regarding matters that concern only themselves, individuals are most likely to be their own best judges:

“But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with he. He is the person most interested in his own well being; the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect; while with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, has its proper field of action.”

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

C. Freedom of Thought and Discussion (On Liberty, ch. II)

It includes liberty of conscience, liberty of feeling, liberty of opinion and sentiment on scientific, moral, and theological subjects, as well as the liberty to express and publish opinions.

Allowance of these liberties benefits the general good regardless whether opinions are true, false, or partly true and partly false. Since human judgment are fallible, we cannot presume to know with certainty that a particular opinion, no matter how much it conflicts with accepted views, is absolutely false and useless. An opinion, presently not accepted, may turn out later to be true, in which case the common good would have suffered by any suppression of it. Our fallibility is such that we need the freest possible discussion of opposing opinions because our best assurance of the truth of any particular opinion is its shown superiority in tests against all possible opposing opinions. The common good is best served by a climate in which individuals are free to state boldly their opinions rather than suppressing them for fear of public punishment:

“No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead . . . Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than b the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think.”

Even if particular opinions are simply false, the common good benefits from their free expression because this forces holders of true opinions to defend and thereby better understand their opinions so they hold them as “living truths” rather than as “dead dogmas.” Generally, the false opinions often contain some portion of truth, in which case their free expression serves the common good as a corrective device leading to the improvement of otherwise acceptable opinions.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

B. Individualism in On Liberty

He argues for freedom of thought and discussion, freedom of action, and freedom of association.

Self regarding Actions: Society or government has no right to interfere with actions affecting only oneself, that is self-regarding actions: “ The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part, which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” (On Liberty, ch. 1)

Mil opposes the stifling of the individual by government officials as well as by public opinion, the “tyranny of the majority” (whether the majority be a numerical majority or an influential minority accepted as the majority). In defending individual freedoms, he bases his arguments on “utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.” (On Liberty, ch. I)

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

IV. Social Philosophy

A. Justice (from Utilitarianism)

Of all the rules governing morality that are grounded upon the Principle of Utility, the requirements of justice are the most fundamental because they are essential to preserving peace and preventing harm among persons. In its most basis senses, justice forbids (1) the wrongful exercise of power over another person, and (2) the withholding of what is rightfully due a person. The requirements of justice establish various protections for the individual such as moral or legal rights to personal liberty and property, guarantees of impartial and equal treatment before the law, prohibitions against undeserved or disproportionate punishments, and condemnation of breaches of faith, whether of friendship or of promise.

Justice as a moral sentiment develops from an initial, natural tendency to retaliate against harm to ourselves that is generalized through the enormous human capacity (a) to include all human beings with the range of our sympathy and (b) to use our intelligence so as to recognize a threat to the security of society as a threat to ourselves. Justice becomes a moral sentiment only “when moralized by the social feeling” in such a way that we act consciously in “directions conformable to the general good.”

“It is common enough certainly though the reverse of commendable to feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain; but a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling, that is, who considers whether an act is blamable before he allows himself to resent it such a person, though he may not say expressly to himself that he is standing up for the interest of society, certainly does not feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own. If he is not feeling this, if he is regarding the act solely as it affects him individually, he is not consciously just; he is not concerning himself about the justice of his actions.” (From Utilitarianism)

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

D. Applying the Principle of Utility (Utilitarianism, ch. II)

Despite any difficulties, the Principle of Utility still is a better guide to moral action than any other principle. For most people most of the time, taking account of everyone’s interests in making a decision seldom involves large numbers of people. Regarding any time problem in arriving at decisions, he argues that human beings have sufficient past experience to establish rules, based upon the Principle of Utility, that serve as guides for actions without out having to make decisions anew all of the time. Thus, for example, we can establish on Utilitarian grounds the rule that stealing is wrong and can then follow this rule rather than having to determine the precise pleasure and pain for all persons involved whenever an occasion for stealing arises.

Regarding for instance Mill’s position on lying, in Utilitarianism Mill records, “ . . . . It would often be expedient for the purpose of getting over momentary embarrassment or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity, is one of the most useful and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional deviation from truth does that much toward weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principle support of all present social well being, but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back civilization, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends; we feel that the violation for a present advantage of a rule of such transcendent expediency is not expedient and that he who for the sake of a convenience to himself or to some other individual does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place in each other’s word, acts the part of one of their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists; the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially an individual other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening the reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighting these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates.” Rules may require improvement with further experience, however.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

C. Justification of the Principle of Utility

1. The Principle of Utility finds its ultimate justification in the social feeling of mankind, although Mill grants that “this feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether.” (Utilitarianism, ch. 3)

2. Optimism About Its Gradual Acceptance – In Utilitarianism he wrote,

“But there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment; and this it is which, when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with out fellow-creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilization. The social state is at once so natural so necessary, and so habitual to man, that except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives of himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence. Any condition, therefore, which is essential to a state of society becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person’s conception of the state of things which he both into, and which is the destiny of a human being. Now, society between human beings, except in the relation of a master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interest of all are to be consulted. Society between equals can only exist on the understanding tat the interests of al are to be regarded equally. And since in all states of civilization, every person, except an absolute monarch, has equals, everyone is obliged to live on these terms with somebody; and in every age some advance is made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody. In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people’s interests. They are under a necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser injuries, and (if only for their own protection) living in a state of constant protest against them. They are also familiar with the fact of cooperating with others, and proposing to themselves a collective, not an individual interest as the aim (at least for the time being) of their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others, it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence. Now whatever amount of this feeling a person has, he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate it, and to the utmost of his power encourage it in others; and even if he has none of it himself, he is greatly interested as anyone else that others should have it. Consequently, the smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education; and a complete web of corroborative association is woven around it, by the powerful agency of the eternal sanctions. This mode of conceiving ourselves and human life civilization goes on, is felt to be more and more natural. Every step in political improvement renders it more so, by removing the sources of opposition of interest, and leveling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes, owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it is still practicable to disregard. In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself in the benefits of which they are not included. If we now suppose those feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion directed as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it, I think that no one who can realize this conception will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the happiness of morality.” (Utilitarianism, ch. III)

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

B. Quality of Pleasure

1. Bentham was qualitatively neutral, insisting that the quantity not the quality of pleasure is important.

2. Mill though argued that quality is important and that intellectual pleasures are intrinsically superior to sensual ones: “Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, not instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dance, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with their. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other part to the comparison knows both sides.” (Utilitarianism, ch. II)

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

b. “If the opinion of which I have now stated is psychologically true, if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it is necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole. And now to decide whether this is really so; whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the absence is pa pain we have evidently arrived at a question of fact and experience, dependent, like al similar questions, upon evidence . . . . “ (Utilitarianism, ch. IV)

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

3. Mill’s Argument

a. “If I apprehend the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people actually do desire it . . . . No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only al the proof which the case admits of, but all which is possible ti require, that happiness is a good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.” (Utilitarianism, ch. IV)

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

2. The Principle of Utility (also from Introduction to the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation): “By utility is meant that property in any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered if that part be the community in general, then the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.”

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

III. Mill’s Utilitarianism

A. Acceptance of Bentham’s psychological hedonism and the principle of utility.

1. Psychological Hedonism: Psychological hedonists argue that human beings, as a fact of their psychological make up, do act so as to achieve pleasure and avoid pain. That is, human nature is so constituted that we are compelled to act in this way. Bentham states this position succinctly in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. ON the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in al we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.”

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

II. Influence

Mill is the most important British philosopher of the 19th century. He continued, some would say, “concluded”, the development of British empiricism. He continued to develop and defend Utilitarianism and during a long career, he wrote extensively on the whole range of philosophical issues His work, On Liberty, is one of the real classics in western civilizations and in that particular work he especially defends individual freedom. He contributed to development of the social sciences. In logic, he challenged the importance of deduction and formulated canons of induction such as agreement, difference, concomitant variation and residues. He also tried to resolve the problem of induction. He argued for the empirical status of mathematics, presenting an important challenge in mathematical thought, although not many philosophers of mathematics have supported him regarding this matter.

19th Century Philosophers: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

I. Life

John Stuart Mill, a British philosopher, received a rigorous education supervised by his father James Mill, a close friend and philosophical colleague of Jeremy Bentham. He began studying Greek at age three and had read all of Herodotus and some other Greek writings by age eight, at which time he began studying Latin. From age 8-12, he studied geometry, algebra, and some calculus, along with histories, adventure books, Latin and Greek authors. At age 12, he began study of Aristotle’s logical works and read his father’s History of India. At 13, his father took him through a complete course of political economy.

In 1823, his father got him a position with the East India Company, where he worked for 35 years. By 1824, he was editing some writings of Bentham for publication and was soon writing articles of his own for the Westminster Review. In 1826, he began to suffer from bouts of depression, which he eventually attributed to his having developed his analytic skills at the expense of his feelings. In overcoming the problem he give special credit to Wordsworth’s poetry. In 1830, he met the love of his life, Harriet Taylor, who was already married; they commenced a close friendship and intellectual collaboration for some 20 years until they were ale to marry after her husband’s death.

Harriet Taylor died in 1859; Mill later served in Parliament (1865-1868). He came to embrace the Utilitarianism of his father and Bentham, although he made some unique additions of his own to their basic position. For example, he insisted on greater appreciation of the role of feelings in making Utilitarian judgments and he stressed the qualitative superiority of intellectual pleasures to sensual ones.

During the nineteenth century, through his writings, John Stuart Mill became the most influential philosopher in the English-speaking world. His major works include: A System of Logic (1843), Principles of Political Economy (1848), On Liberty (1859), Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Utilitarianism (1863), The Subjection of Women (1869), Autobiography (1873)

19th Century Philosophers: Comte

VI. Religion of Humanity (developed during the latter stage of Comte’s life)

A. Need: There is a “need” for the organization of feeling, in addition to the application of positivism.

B. Nature: Humanity conceived as the “Great Being” should be he object of religious fervor. The clergy should consist of those well versed in positivism. Comte saw himself as the high priest of the religion. The religion includes a calendar and holydays based upon recognition of persons who made great contributions to the advance of society. There is also a positivist’s library (scriptural texts) of works by persons who made great contributions to the advancement of society.

19th Century Philosophers: Comte

V. Civilization

A. Elements of Civilization

Elements of civilization include science, industry, and the find arts. The fine arts predominate during the most primitive development of social organization.

B. The Progress of Civilization

“ . . . the elementary march of civilization is unquestionably subject to a natural and unvariable laws that overrules all special human divergences.” (ACP, 41). Hence the progress of civilization is “is in essentials unalterable.” (ACP, 42) The rapidity of the progress may vary however.

“Generally speaking, when the individual appears to exert a great influence, it is not due to his own forces, since these are extremely small. Forces external to him act in his favor according to laws over which he has no control. His entire power lies in the intelligent apprehension of these laws through observation, his forecast of their effects, and the power of subordinating them in the desired end that he thus obtains, provided that he employs them in accordance with their nature. The effect once produced, ignorance of natural laws leads the spectator and sometimes the actor himself to attribute to the power of man what is really due only to his foresight.” (ACP, 43)

C. The Three Grand Epochs of Civilization

There are three grand epochs of civilization: The theological, the metaphysical and juridical epoch, and the scientific and industrial epoch.

The theological and military epoch presents the reality that theoretical conceptions bear a supernatural imprint and conquest as the aim of a society. Theological convictions bring about “blind and involuntary confidence in military superiors” (ACP, 296). It is characterized by emphasis upon imagination over observation, industrial pursuits to serve military aims, and the slavery of the producers.

The metaphysical and juridical epochs is a transitionary stage which is still based upon imagination, but with the greater use of observation and industry as well as a turning away from slavery of the producers to some extent. It is characterized by criticism and argument.

The scientific and industrial epoch proposes that observation predominates over imagination and the arbitrary of all the positive forces—that of the savants to determine the plan of the new system: that of the artists to cause its universal adoption; that of the industrial chiefs to put it into immediate execution by establishing the needful practical institutions (ACP, 51) “Government by measures replaces government by men.” (ACP, 49)

“Human activity . . . passes successively through the stages of offensive warfare, defensive warfare, and industry. (ACP, 329) – corresponding to the three epochs. It corresponds to the division of history into the ancient, medieval and modern.

19th Century Philosophers: Comte

IV. Positive Philosophy (Science)

A. All phenomena are subject to “invariable natural Laws.” Rejection of the search for absolute knowledge is to be found in this area of concern. First and final causes are rejected in favor of an attempt to “analyze accurately the circumstances of phenomena, and to connect them by the natural relations of succession and resemblance. For example, the Laws of Universal Gravitation connects numerous facts without giving any ultimate meaning to weight and attraction.

B. General Method: Observation, Experiment, and Comparison”

“Facts cannot be o served without the guidance of some theory.” So some theoretical structure is necessary in science. Facts do not simply show themselves.

C. Hierarchy of the Sciences: Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology and Social Physics constitute the hierarchy. Pure mathematics provides the model for reasoning and evidence in the science. Of the natural sciences, Astronomy is the “most general, simple, and abstract of all.” Social Physics, like Physics itself, may be divided into Static and Dynamics.

Social Statics studies the social organization in terms of the individual, the family, the society, and eventually the whole human species. “The static study of sociology consists in the investigation of the laws of action and reaction of the different parts of the social system—apart, for the occasion, from the fundamental movement that is always gradually modifying them (224, ACP).

Social Dynamics, which is more interesting) studies the natural progress of societies. “The true general spirit of social dynamics then, consists in conceiving of teach of these consecutive social states as the necessary result of the preceding and the indispensable mover of the following . . . . “ (p. 230, ACP). As one moves up the hierarchy, the science becomes less exact and less systematic.

D. Reductionism:

Science attempts to discover the smallest number of laws to explain all phenomena. In the hierarchy, each higher science is dependent upon the simpler, more general science below it. So chemistry is dependent upon physics and social physics is dependent upon physiology. The higher science cannot be effectively studied before competent knowledge is acquired in the lower science. Although a dependency exists among the sciences and an important unity of method exists, each also has its own special methods and its doctrines are not entirely reducible to the more basic science—although the doctrines of both sciences remain “homogeneous”.

E. Rejection of Introspective Psychology

Any attempt to discover laws of the mind through any sort of introspective psychology is theological or metaphysical rather than scientific. “Interior observation” supposes the absurdity of “a man seeing himself think. Physiological study of the intellectual organs (“phrenological psychology”) is the proper method of science. For example, one should study the anatomy and physiology, that is, the structure and function of the brain. There is no interior state of personal identity, “the I,” that exists over and above a human beings animal function. The very abstract and indirect notion of the “I proceed” from a sense harmony within the organism. So there is no sharp difference in kind between human beings and others animals. Thus animals can reason to some degree and also exhibit characteristics of moral phenomena.

F. Determinism

Since all phenomena are subject to invariable natural laws, all human actions are determined. Determinism does not lead to fatalism however since knowledge shows that human beings are capable of unending modifications. So there is always hope for human progress (p. 188, ACP)

G. Social Reorganization

Society needs to be reorganized on the basis of knowledge of social physics. In the future, it will be possible to attain a natural and regular or normal society—as opposed to the present revolutionary state of things. Political wisdom consists in political practice in accord with social physics (pp. 238-39, ACP). An industrial-scientific elite should announce the invariable laws governing society and direct the society. Women functioning within the family are the primary originators of spirituality and morality within the society. Workers should recognize the dignity of their labor and their need to serve the greater interests of society.

19th Century Philosophers: Comte

III. The Law of Three Stages

“Each of our leading conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: The Theological or fictitious; the Metaphysical or abstract; and the Scientific or the positive.

A. The Theological State

There is a search for absolute knowledge in terms of first and final causes; and all phenomena re conceived to be produced by the action of supernatural beings. The stage begins with polytheism and ends with monotheism.

B. The Metaphysical State

There is a search or absolute knowledge in terms of first and final causes, but all phenomena are conceived to be produced by abstract forces or verified entities or personified abstractions, for example Plato’s Forms. (RY) The stage begins with many entities and ends with one, namely Nature.

19th Century Philosophers: Comte

II. Influence

Comte saw himself and is often seen by others to be the founder of sociology. He coined the term, although he also uses the term “social physics.” He advocated the use of social physics as a way of improving the direction of society.

Comte can also be looked upon as the founder of positivism as a philosophical movement, although he later took positivism in a direction that would be unacceptable to twentieth century logical positivists who probably instead would look to Ernst Mach as a much better model.

Comte’s views of social progress, a science of moral phenomena and of a religion of humanity do not appeal to logical positivists. Comte is especially admitted for being a systematic thinker. He constructed a unified system of the sciences with reductionistic transitions that foreshadows attempts to establish a unified reductionist science in the twentieth century.

A number of his concepts, for example the law of three stages, the religion of humanity, are challenging and provocative even when they did not gain acceptance.

19th Century Philosophers: Comte

19th Century Philosophers:
August Comte (1798-1857)

I. Life

Comte came from a reasonably well-to-do family, his father being a regional tax collector. He rejected fairly early his family’s fervent Catholicism and Royalism, announcing his atheism at the age of 14. He seems to have maintained a “love-hate” relationship with his family throughout his entire life. He was an excellent student who studied for two years at the Ecole Polytechnique, a premier school devoted to the study of the sciences. In 1818 he because a secretary to and a disciple of the French social philosopher Saint-Simon (1760-1825), although they had a falling-out shortly before Saint-Simon’s death. Saint-Simon was an inventive but not a systematic thinker. Comte took over several ideas from him and developed them. For example (a) the idea of founding and directing society on a scientific basis and (b) developing a science of human behavior.

He entered into an unhappy marriage at his family’s insistence in 1825. He separated from his wife in 1842 and then established a brief relationship with a Madame Clotilde de Vaux, whose husband had been sentenced to the galleys for life. She apparently had influence upon Comte’s later philosophy. IN 1826 he began to offer a course of lectures on his Positive Philosophy and attracted some noteworthy thinkers, such as the scientist Humboldt, but he soon suffered a mental breakdown. His recovery took a year and at some point he threw himself into the Seine River in Paris but was rescued. He resumed his lectures in 1828. Between 1839 and 1842 he published the Course of Positive Philosophy in six volumes.

In 1833 he became an examiner for students applying to the Ecole Polytechnique, a position that doubled his modest income, although he lost the position because of some comments in the Preface to the sixth volume of the Course of Positive Philosophy. During the years 1852-54 he published his System of Positive Polity. As a person, Comte was a rather egotistical and arrogant individual although he was also supremely and sincerely devoted to what he took to be his role in bringing about human progress. John Stuart Mill solicited three English friends to give Comte some money for a temporary time after the loss of the examiner’s position. When they stopped sending the money after a year, Comte accused them of falling away from righteousness and high-mindedness.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

G. The Marxist conception of science

1. Marx’ attack upon philosophers is unnecessarily harsh. Philosophers have usually always expected changes in practice to result from their system of ideas (although there are exceptions of course). With respect to changing human life, Marx makes no allowance for the fact that advances in the social sciences are frequently prerequisites for changing human life and historically their development followed after development of natural sciences.

2. The attempt to eliminate speculation and reduce theory is an error committed by numerous well-qualified scientists; and Marx is no exception. A book worth reading on this issue is Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Speculation and theory are essential to scientific progress.

3. It may be agreed with Marx that: (1) the ultimate aim of knowledge—and of the social sciences, in particular—is the improvement of the human condition. (2) Philosophers and scientists also have been less active in bringing about social change than they should have been. (3) They sometimes fail to recognize that practical knowledge and hence practice is an essential concomitant of theoretical knowledge (4) The Non-activist approach leas to knowledge becoming a tool of the prevailing power structure of the society. On the other hand it may be that (1) The satisfaction of curiosity, or knowledge for the sake of knowledge cannot and should not be entirely eliminated as an aim of knowledge and (2) Not every search after knowledge fits into the “activist mold” and (3) Advances in knowledge can and often enough, do occur in the absence of a commitment or effort to better the human condition.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

F. Summary: Although the criticisms of Harris and Popper bring out real risks and difficulties in the Marxist position, their own alternatives involve risks and difficulties at least as great as any associated with the Marxist conception of science. Popper’s advocacy of a piecemeal social engineering appears to be inadequate or short sighted.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

E. Karl Popper’s criticisms

1. How scientific historicism can be depends upon the stringency of requirements for scientific knowledge. Although the historicist position falls short of the criteria for an exact science, the position does make use of many scientific techniques that establish an inexact science, in my judgment.

2. Piecemeal social engineering may be more respectable scientifically than historicism according to the traditional criteria; but its adequacy in social science is questionable. Piecemeal social engineering ignores even more factors than descriptions of “social wholes.”

3. Popper’s preferences notwithstanding, people (including politicians and social scientists) formulate generalizations about social wholes. How you formulate these generalizations not whether you should do so is the real question. And Popper’s insistence upon piecemeal social engineering merely hinders the adequacy of the formulations by excluding the use of eligible scientific methods.

4. Popper’s own advocacy of piecemeal social engineering is based upon minimal generalizations about social wholes – e.g. we cannot understand them or generalizations about them are not testable. I am not convinced that these generalizations are correct.

5. Since decisions about holistic social development are unavoidable and Popper asserts that scientific methods cannot guide these decisions, his position leads to decisions and subsequent development based upon prejudice or unreliable methods—unless he wants to argue that these decisions cannot control social development.

6. There are numerous scientific tests of historicist’s positions, including Marxism, which are available. If these tests prove to be less conclusive than tests in physics or if results of tests do not convince a particular historicist, we cannot thereby conclude that historicist’s positions are untestable.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

D Marvin Harris’ criticisms

1. Harris interprets the unity of theory and practice too narrowly. From the Marxist standpoint, meteorologists need not produce tornadoes, hurricanes and thunderstorms, but they should be able to advise people about the means of protecting themselves from tornadoes, etc.

The dangers of politicizing science are real, although there are also dangers associated with “neutral” science. Science separated from practice does tend to become merely a tool of the currently prevailing ruling class. For example, if higher education tries to remain “neutral” with respect to changing society, does it not thereby serve to preserve the status quo? Is it possible to be really neural? Marxists do not think so.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

C. Commentary by Ron Yezzi

1. Issues in the philosophy of social science raised by the Marxist position. What is the relation between theory and practice in social science? Must the social scientist be committed to changing the society? Is a unification of sciences possible? How should it be accomplished? How should “truth” be determined in the Social Science? Is “holism” or “methodological individualism” the proper approach o the study of social phenomena? To what extent are large-scale social predictions possible? Is human nature changeable? Does an emphasis on practice introduce insurmountable bias into the study of social phenomena? Can a single factor such as the modes of production be primary in explaining social phenomena? Can the process of social development be understood scientifically?

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

B. Criticisms by Karl Popper in The Poverty of Historicism

1. The Marxist position is a type of historicism – “an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principle aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the rhythms of patterns the laws or the trends that underlie the evolution of history.

2. Since we never fully understand “social wholes” some important factors always are being ignored; large-scale predictions about society are prophecies rather than scientific predictions. In the social sciences, only piecemeal social engineering is possible.

3. Social wholes are not greater than the sum of their parts; so society is an aggregate of individuals, “the task of social theory is to construct and to analyze our sociological models carefully in descriptive or nominalistic terms, that is to say “in terms of individuals”, of their attitudes, expectations, relations, etc. – a postulate which may be called “methodological individualism.”

4. No laws of historical revolution are discoverable because there can be no law to describe a unique process.

5. Historical trends are not laws. Trends are not changeable; so hey cannot satisfy the criterion of universality for laws. The dependence of trends upon changing conditions demands that a researcher constantly seek out possible conditions, which alter description and explanation; but the historicist ignores these possible conditions.

6. Large scale social predictions are untestable. IN piecemeal social engineering here is a careful lying out of expectations and procedures whereby the social scientist and lean from mistakes; such careful laying out does not occur in the historicists construction of grand theories. Large-scale social changes inevitably arouse resistance among the people affected but this fact does not constitute as disconfirmation of the particular social hypothesis from the historicist standpoint.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

VIII. A Critique of Marxist Science

A. Criticisms by Marvin Harris in The Rise of Anthropological Theory

1. The unity of theory and practice is sometimes unacceptable.

a. Although there is a superficial resemblance between the scientific techniques of confirming predictions through experience and “changing the world,” there are differences also.

b. “No one insists that meteorologists must justify their respective models of ice ages by producing new advance of the continental glaciers. Nor do we expect that alternative explanations of meteorological phenomena require made-to-do order hurricanes, tornadoes and thunderstorms.”

c. “In the historical sciences, the doctrine of unity between theory and practice is rendered superfluous by the possibility of subjecting one’s predictions to the test not of the future, but of past events”, i.e. the test of future practice may be unnecessary.

2. The insistence upon changing the world politicizes science so ass to turn science into dogma.

a. Marx’ insistence upon conscientious scholarship is insufficient protection, in practice.

b. “Thus the Marxist sociologists would seem to enjoy a mandate to change data in order to make it more useful in changing the world, subject only to the usual limitations imposed upon wartime propaganda. On the one hand, repeated falsification diminishes credibility and runs the risk of self-defeat; o the other, acceptance of one’s own propaganda may eventually destroy the objective basis of action.”


3. The insistence upon a single factor, viz, the material modes of production, to explain all social phenomena is a mistake.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

5. Major Themes of Social Science

a. The meaning and direction of ideas as well as actions are given through an understanding of the historical process in which these ideas and actions occur.

b. The historical process, which records changes in the modes of material life, is driven overwhelmingly by changes in the material modes of production, i.e. the ways by which people produce goods for subsistence. (In effect, the modes of production are associable with the economic structure of the society.)

c. Since social being, i.e. the state of society, determines what the individual human being is, society is not simply an aggregate of individuals. According to Marx, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.”

d. Again, according to Marx, “The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.”

e. Since what human beings are depends upon the existing social relationships and these social relationships change with time, human nature is changeable.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

4. Truth:

a. According to Marx, “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.”

b. The truth of statements and theories is decided ultimately by the way in which they affect the modes of material life.

c. Truth is inseparable from the historical process because the historical process consists of changing modes of material life. Hence truth is inseparable from history which records and makes sense of this process.

d. The “truths” in the consciousness of a ruling class at odds with the historical process are mere deceits. According to Marx, “the more the established form of intercourse in society and thus the conditions of the ruling class, come into conflict wit the developed productive forces, and the greater therefore is the dissension within the ruling class itself and between it and the subject class, the less veridical naturally becomes the consciousness which originates from and expresses this form of intercourse; i.e it ceases to express it. The earlier conceptions of these relations of intercourse in which the real individual interests were asserted as general interests decline into mere idealizing phrases, conscious illusions and deliberate deceits. But the more they are condemned as falsehoods, and the less they satisfy the understanding, the more dogmatically they are asserted and the more deceitful, moralizing and spiritual becomes the language of established society.” The abstract concept of truth promulgated through idealistic science, viz. the separation of truth from practice is a deceit fostered by the bourgeoisie. This explanation of truth does not and should not abrogate the need for conscientious scholarship. According to Marx, “I call any man a ‘scoundrel’ who tries to accommodate scholarship (whatever its failings) to principles not inherent in it bur derived from interests external and alien to it.”

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

3. Revolutionary Science: If the acquisition of scientific knowledge does not change the modes of material life, then no authentic science is resent. Hence science must be revolutionary. Material life is a process; and science is an instrument of change within that process. Science merely for the sake of science is a deception.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

2. The Unification of Science: Because of the emphasis upon practice, physical and biological sciences must be understood in terms of heir effects o on the modes of material life. Therefore, there is no real separation between natural and social sciences. Atomic theory, for example, is not simply understood to be an abstract account of the way the universe exists. Rather it is understood in terms of the way it affects the lives of people. Atomic bombs and nuclear power plants are not incidental applications of atomic theory; rather they are part of what atomic theory is. They establish an essential connection between theory and the modes of material life.

The separation of science from technology is artificial and misleading. It is technology, which motivates and inspires scientific thought—since technology deals directly with the modes of material life.

The relating of every science to the modes of material life establishes a unitary science.

19th Century Philosophers: Marx

VII. The Marxist Conception of Science (originated from writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin)

1. The Relationship Between Philosophy and Science: There are the following types of philosophic ontology’s: Idealism, Empiricism, and Materialism. The following types of scientific perspectives exist: Idealistic or Bourgeois Science and Scientific dialectic science.


a. Idealism is primarily concerned with systems of ideas. When Marx attacks philosophy he is usually referring to idealism – which he looks upon as the essence of what philosophy is. According to Marx, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it. Although Empiricism and Materialism are types of philosophy, they differ from Idealism in that they are partially generating sciences.

b. Empiricism is primarily concerned with sense observations – in particular sense impressions. Although empiricism generates science, the science so generated is associated with Idealism—in the sense that science becomes a system of ideas used to describe and explain the world without trying to change it. The disdain of the pure scientist for the applied scientist, i.e. the disdain of the scientist for the engineer, signifies the Idealistic tendencies of science generated by Empiricism. In the current period of history, this science is labeled as “bourgeois” because being unconcerned with practical matters, it merely represents the prevailing system of ideas of the ruling class, viz, the capitalists.

c. Materialism is primarily concerned with the modes of material life—the ways and means by which people live from day to day.

Practice takes precedence before theory. The only worthwhile theory is that immediately generalized from practice. Speculation arising from being too “theoretical” is to be avoided. The emphasis on practice, as opposed to theory, generates authentic science in contrast with he bourgeois science generated by empiricism. The emphasis on practice guarantees that observation rather than speculation produced generalizations. Scientific Dialectical Materialism is a science rather than an ideology.

Process takes precedence before formal structures. Authentic science observes the processes of human life. Dialectical opposition characterizes the processes of human life.