Part 1 What is the nature of ethical knowledge?
Is ethical knowledge or knowledge or "right" and "wrong" aposteriori knowledge or apriori knowledge? We use the terms "right" and "good" or "moral" and "immoral" frequently. By our use of those words we are referring to behavior that is either to be pursued or to be rejected. But the question emerges from our consideration of the ethical as to exactly what the nature of ethical knowledge is. Again, we are not asking what is right or wrong but how do we determine what the essential nature "rightness" or "wrongness" is. Is ethical knowledge derived from experience or aposteriori knowledge or is ethical knowledge innate or apriori knowledge? It seems that it is not as though I can see in the act of stealing, for example, the wrongness of the act. Therefore, the moral quality of an action is not found in the sensory character of an action. Consequently, it appears that ethical knowledge is more similar to apriori knowledge or non-sensory knowledge. However, it should also be stated that there seems to be a unique character to ethical knowledge. In this sense ethical knowledge is a very puzzling knowledge.
Part 2 J. L. Mackie and Ethical Knowledge
There are those such as J. L. Mackie who argued that ethical knowledge is to be considered "non natural" or not natural knowledge. Mackie contended that ethical statements are "queer" or "odd" or "peculiar" statements. Therefore ethical statements should be questioned. For instance, what is goodness? Is "goodness" a property at all? Why do we have to suppose that there are moral facts or moral truths at all? He argued that maybe we shouldn't think of moral statements in this fashion at all. Previously we argued that "truth" should be determined by what is termed "correspondence theory." That is, truth corresponds to something in the external world. But how can correspondence theory be applied to ethical truth or ethical knowledge? For example if truth is determined by correspondence to the external world, to what in the external world does ethical truth correspond? What kind of external state of affairs is it? Where is the correspondence between ethical facts and the external world? Determining this is truly problematic.
This position has led to a view, which attempts to side step the issue of correspondence theory in relation to ethical knowledge. The theory is called Non factualism or Ethical Emotivism. It proposes that ethical statements do not express facts at all. But what do they do? Emotivism argues that ethical statements or utterances are nothing more than the expression of emotions. The theory of ethical Emotivism was advocated by the logical positivists. It is also called the "Boo/Hurrah" ethical theory. According to this viewpoint, ethical statements are nothing more than disguised nonsense and correspond to nothing external. When I see someone steal I say, "Boo" or "that's terrible." It is the expression of an emotion of disapproval. M speech act expresses that emotion. "Boo" does not express an actual fact according to this theory. There are mo moral properties or truths in ethical Emotivism. Ethics is to be equated with a feeling or a desire.
What is the advantage of this theory of ethical knowledge? First it avoids the search for moral "facts." It deals with moral language. Second, ethical Emotivism also gives a more accurate account of the reality of moral statements. Ethical Emotivism does acknowledge that emotions play a part in moral statements, though perhaps it goes to far in this. But positively speaking, ethical Emotivism affirms that morality is truly about emotions and that this is an escapable component of ethical talk.
On the other hand there is "Cognitivism" which stands in contradistinction to "Non Cognitivism" of which ethical Emotivism is a type. Cognitivism argues that there is actually something factual to be considered at the heart of a moral statement or the claim to moral knowledge.
In addition, there is descriptivism and prescriptivism. Descriptive ethical statements are those, which simply describe a moral state of affairs. Prescriptivism on the other hand says that moral language prescribes or orders a moral course of action. For example, to say, "Stealing is wrong" is the same as to say, "Don't steal." In other words we are determining an "ought" from an "is." When I say something is wrong, I am therefore according to prescriptivism implying that I ought not to do it and conversely with regard to that which is right.
Part 3 Moral Statements as Imperatives
Consider for example the statement, "Love thy neighbor." This Christian ethical mandate is stated in the imperatival form. It is a command. This has been seized on by the non-Cognitivist as saying that this proves that moral statements are covert imperatives. However, the opposing view or the Cognitivist view, contends that moral inquiry is the same as any other inquiry. When we make a moral statement, we are simply trying to find out the facts as we do with such disciplines as mathematics, psychology, or physics. We are thinking an issue through and arriving at what we thick the moral truth is or what the moral facts are. In this sense ethical statements and ethical knowledge takes on a metaphysical dimension it seems. For example, suppose I say, "Abortion is wrong in the seventh month of pregnancy." Cognitivists propose that I investigate the issue, think the issue through and then reach this conclusion.
Part 4 Cognitivism and Moral Realism
Cognitivism or Moral Realism contends that I do not investigate a moral question with my senses. In this sense ethical knowledge is apriori. I am to think my way through the ethical dilemma with which I am confronted. But the question is by what faculty do I come to know ethical facts and possess ethical knowledge? Bertrand Russell argues in his work "Problems in Philosophy" that ethical knowledge is a type of apriori knowledge. I other words, when I know that murder is wrong, I have apriori knowledge that murder is wrong as with a mathematical formula such as 2+2=4. This is the same type of knowledge as analytic knowledge. Ethics then becomes as solid as mathematics and consequently there is nothing dubious about ethical knowledge.
Bertrand Russell in problems of philosophy book apriori knowledge is a type of apriori knowledge.
Part 5 Evaluating Cognitivism and Non Cognitivism
Non-cognitivism leads to moral relativism. If all there is emotion is moral discourse, then morality may vary from individual to individual or from context to context. Murder may be wrong in one context according to one individual, but murder is right in a different context according to different individuals. Cognitivist view moral facts as actual moral facts on the other hand and there are therefore no danger of relativism. Emotivist or Non Cognitivist would argue that murder is wrong simply because of a bad emotion or desire, which we have about murder. Cognitivist would argue on the other hand that murder is wrong based on the reality of it.
Part 6 Ethics and God
Many believe that morality is only binding if God is behind it. However is this actually true. If God is the foundation according to some individuals then we can avoid moral relativism. Indeed some would argue that this is the only way to avoid moral relativism. In short, God is indispensable to morality. For example, what makes stealing wrong? These would say that stealing is wrong because God says it is wrong. This is a very tempting idea but the question exists as to whether this is a legitimate deduction or not. Socrates himself in Plato's Dialogue entitled Euthyphro refuted it. In the work Socrates is wandering around Athens and he is discussing with his interlocutors how to define the good and the holy. Euthyphro contends that he has the answer. The holy and the good is what the gods love while the bad is what the gods deplored or hate. It is a very simple idea. It is summed up on Christian terminology in divine command theory. God commands an action that makes that action right. God prohibits an action, which makes that action wrong. Socrates then asks Euthyphro as to whether he thinks something is actually wrong because the gods decree that it is wrong to which Euthyphro responds in the affirmative. Socrates then points out the problem with the conclusion. If right is right because the God say that it is right then right and wrong are arbitrary. Consequently, the gods could have decreed otherwise and we could have lived in a sort of topsy-turvy world, although it would not be actually topsy-turvy since we would not know otherwise. The question centers upon the following dilemma: is something wrong because the gods say it is wrong or do the gods decree something as wrong because it is wrong in and of itself? Socrates is saying that we surely do not want morality to be arbitrary or to depend upon God's stipulation. In Socrates conclusion, God is not the basis of morality but God is the one who respects morality. It is an interesting observation. The important consequence of this reality lies in the proposition that even if there is no god, therefore it does not detract from morality. Even if there is no god then morality stands. To lose God is not to lose morality. God is not the foundation for moral beliefs. This addresses the issue that people worry about. Even if there is a God, on the other hand, he is not the basis for morality.
