11.6.09

KNOWLEDGE



Part 1: Knowledge as Justified True Belief

Let's consider the question, "What is knowledge?" It is important to understand from the outset what is intended by the specific question. With this question we are not concerning ourselves with the question, "What do I know?" Rather we are concerned with a conceptual analysis of the nature of knowledge. We need to break the concept of "knowledge" into parts in order to understand the essence or the very nature of knowledge.

This is how the discipline of philosophy approaches the issue of knowledge. It asks, "What are the conceptual constituents of knowledge?" and consequently we need to pin down some philosophical terminology at this point. As we will see in one moment the conceptual elements of knowledge consist of justified true belief. But before proceeding to these elements there are two preliminary elements or concepts that we must consider. These are Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.


Part 2: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

There are two types of conditions that are central in this instance to arriving at an adequate understanding of the nature of knowledge. First we must understand necessary conditions and secondly sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions are those conditions that must be satisfied for me to be capable of saying that I know something to be true. Sufficient conditions are those conditions which when satisfied will provide enough knowledge for me to be capable of saying that I have knowledge. With these definitions in mind, we move now to the three parts or constituents of knowledge.


Part 3: Justified True Belief

Knowledge is said by philosophers to consist of "true justified belief." In other words these three parts or constituents are central to the nature of knowledge. If someone has knowledge of something then his or her knowledge should be true, should be justified, and should be believed. Let's examine these a bit more closely.

Belief: This is the most obvious element of knowledge. For example someone must believe that the Battle of Hastings took place in Paris, France in 1056. This is a necessary condition. However, it should be noted that belief is not sufficient in and of itself for justifying knowledge. Just because I believe something does not make it true. I can believe that an elephant is in the corner, but this believe regardless of how sincerely I hold it, does not make this to be true.

There are instances of someone endorsing a belief or possessing a belief that is false. It should also be said that a person couldn't know something that is false. This is inherently a contradiction. For something to be known it must be true. This is a necessary condition.

In addition, a person must be justified in their belief. Knowledge cannot be accidentally true, as we shall see later in our consideration of the nature of knowledge. Suppose I state that I am going to win the lottery tomorrow and this in fact turns out to be true. Did I know that I would really win the lottery tomorrow? Not at all. I just guessed that I would win. I have to have a justification for my belief if I am to have knowledge of something. These are the three necessary conditions for knowledge.

In summary, this is a philosophical conceptual analysis of the nature of knowledge. Knowledge is made up of these three components: justified true belief. Now let's take another step.


Part 4: Skepticism and Justified True Belief

Skepticism focuses on the justification for knowledge and argues that this justification is not "watertight." For example consider the statement that there is a bottle of water in front of you. Skepticism counters that there may be other explanations. For example, you may be dreaming that there is a bottle of water in front of you and this isn't a very good justification to say that the external world validates a belief. So skepticism attempts to turn the conclusion upside down and concludes that there is a gap between justification and truth.

There are three important components to knowledge. Knowledge consists of justified true belief. Regarding "belief" philososphers do not restrict this "belief" to the consideration of religious or political belief. Rather I can believe there is a bottle in front of me or I can believe that I was playing tennis this afternoon. These are commitments to truth and it is important to understand that beliefs cannot be willed. If I hear bad news and I will that things be otherwise that still doesn't change the truth of what has occurred.

It should be acknowledged, however, that there is a slight qualification to this. There is such a thing as wishful thinking Some individuals can wish themselves into beliefs which are not rationally entitled. Remember that beliefs must come to us passively from the world. I cannot just decide to have a belief. Beliefs at can sometime aim at the truth but they can also sometimes miss the mark. For example, I can believe that the battle of Hastings was fought in Paris, France in 1055 but that would be erroneous and therefore not knowledge since the battle was fought in 1056. The belief must aim at the truth and many beliefs may still be false.

In addition, there must be justification. Why do I believe something to be true? I have to have a justified belief for that to be true. I cannot have a belief for no reason at all. I must have a justification for my belief. I have to have a reason or reasons for my belief. Thereby I am capable of justifying my beliefs. If then someone gives me better reasons for another belief or for a different belief then I must give myself to that belief. In essence, we must also be open to counter arguments. We must be open to arguments and to reasons.


Part 5: Causal Connections: Problem 1

A person can satisfy all of the conditions and still not have knowledge however. Plato found that there is a loophole in this analysis of the nature of knowledge. For example, suppose that my brother is about to visit me at 3:00 p.m. on Saturday. He always visits me at this same time. You hear the doorbell ring and then after having answered the door come to me to tell me that my brother has arrived.

As a result I believe that my brother is at the door. You are a reliable person and have always proven yourself to be a reliable person and you have never led me astray when you tell me something so consequently I believe you. But suppose that you are actually lying to me. You are trying to deceive me and my brother is not at the door though you have actually told me that he is at the door. So far there is no problem with the analysis. But here is the wrinkle in the argument.

Suppose my brother is actually at the door when you are telling me the lie. You thought he wasn't coming and you were lying, but he suddenly showed up while you were telling me he was there. You thought he wasn't coming and you were lying but now he is there at the door.

Now let's review the situation. I have a belief and this belief is now true. So I know that my brother is at the door. Is that really true? Do I really "know" that my brother is at the door? The belief that my brother is at the door is justified and it is true and it is a belief. All of the constituents have been met. But you were lying to me. The entire scenario is based upon deception. Consequently, I do not have knowledge, but I am simply "lucky." It is an accident that my brother is at the door. Truth, justification and belief are not sufficient for knowledge.


Part 6: Causal Connections: Problem 2

Suppose I see you arrive at work each day in a Porsche. I conclude that you, my friend, own a Porsche. It is a justified belief since I see you arrive at work in the Porsche each day. Suppose that this is true in a way however that I do not expect. My friend does not own the Porsche that he drives into the parking lot each morning. He borrowed that Porsche from his friend who is very wealthy.

You might say that belief that he owned a Porsche was a false belief, but herein lays the wrinkle. Suppose the friend doesn't own that particular Porsche but he owns a different Porsche which is an old wreck and which is worth very little and that he keeps in his garage at home and he also never drives it. So the belief is true but not in the way I expect it to be true and his owning the Porsche is unrelated to why I believed he owned a Porsche. I believed it but I did not know it to be true. Once again this was an accident. Again the concept of knowledge is not satisfied because of the flawed connection between the justification and the belief that I endorse.

These realities led philosophers to mend the theory of knowledge. You can analyze a concept in what seems to be an appropriate and reliable manner but it still may be incorrect. In order for a belief to be knowledge it can't be accidentally true. There must be some sort of connection between justification and the truth. Without this connection we do not have a reliable account of knowledge. Returning to our scenarios the Porsche my coworker owns plays no role in knowledge in my knowledge of his owning a Porsche. The Porsche he actually owns doesn't cause me to have the belief. So you might think there is a missing causal connection between the two things and in reality there is no causal connection between the two. In the example of the brother there is once again a missing causal connection. The causal connection is not between the Porsche in the garage and the brother at the door. Rather the causal connection is between the individual giving the report and me. In either case the criteria for knowledge is not satisfied.


Part 7: Causal Connections: Problem 3

The fact that makes the belief true must also be true. This is what we have learned from the two previous examples.

Let's look at another of the example that will bring new light to the role of this causal connection and knowledge. Suppose I am driving through the country. I see haystacks, trees, sheep, and barns. I form various beliefs about these objects. These are rational beliefs and all is as it should be. They I do into a part of the country in which everything is take. It is sort of like a film set. There are fake trees, fake sheep and fake barns. They are all two-dimensional facades. I think that there is a tree; a sheep, a barn but all of these are false representations. They appear to be real but they are not real at all. It just so happens that I then drive by a real barn, however. I say to myself, "There is a real barn." But the fact is that I have gotten this right by sheer accident. I do not actually know that this is a real barn because I have actually thought that each of the other barns, sheep and haystacks are also real. This is knowledge that I have by accident. I have gotten it right but not based upon anything other than accident. Consequently, this isolated case does not constitute real or actual knowledge thought it possesses the qualities of justified true belief.

Again the concept of the causal connection is central to having true knowledge.