A moral formal presentation of the Platonic argument against Divine Command Theory may be presented as follows:
1. Suppose God commands us to do what is right. Then either (a) the right actions are right because he commands them or (b) he commands them because they are right.
2. If we take option (a) then God commands are, from a moral point of view, arbitrary; moreover, the doctrine of the goodness of God is tendered meaningless [i.e., empty or trivial]
3. If we take option (b) then we have acknowledged a standard of right and wrong that is independent of God's will [and therefore committed ourselves to the claim that God is not omnipotent]. We will have in effect given up the theological conception of right and wrong.
4. Therefore, we must either regard God's commands as arbitrary, and give up the doctrine of the goodness of god, or admit that there is a standard of right an wrong that is independent of his will, and give up the theological conception of right and wrong.
5. From a religious point of view, it is undesirable to regard God's commands as arbitrary or to give up the doctrine of the goodness of God.
6. Therefore, even from a religious point of view, a standard of right and wrong that is independent of God's will must be accepted.
It is important to notice how this argument concludes. Point 5 claims that for a religious person, the consequences of accepting Divine Command theory are even worse than the consequences of rejecting Divine command theory. Remember these consequences:
1. To accept Divine Command Theory is to admit that there is an inherent arbitrariness to the rightness or wrongness of moral standards.
2. To accept Divine Command Theory is to reject the understanding of God as good.
Most religious individuals regard these two consequences as intolerable and therefore Divine Command Theory should be rejected.
So, the argument concludes, religious people should actually accept the consequences of rejecting Divine Command Theory and therefore reject Divine Command Theory completely.
