Now we can apply this asymmetry to the question of piety. Suppose a particular act of a human being is loved by the gods. How do we explain this? As seen above, it would be by the activity of loving. We would not explain the activity of loving by the fact that the human act is loved by the gods. On the third account, a pious act just is one that is loved by the gods. Since what is loved by the gods must be explained in terms of their activity of loving, the piety of an act would have to be explained by the activity of loving. Furthermore, the activity of loving could not be explained by the piety of the act, because the piety just is the fact that it is god-loved. There is nothing incoherent in this position, taken by itself. What causes a problem is the admission by Euthyphro that a pious act is god-loved because it is pious. Given this concession, there is a conflict, because as we just stated, being god-loved (and hence pious, as these are the same) cannot explain the activity of loving.
