VII. Liberty and Necessity (from A System of Logic, Bk. VI. Ch. II)
A. Philosophical Necessity:
“Given the motives which are present to an individual’s mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which h he will act might be unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person thoroughly, and know all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict in any physical event.”
This is merely an “interpretation of universal experience. If we know all the relevant circumstances and the character of a person, we believe we can predict how the person would act. We only hesitate because we lack all the relevant information. Moreover, we do not think that we stop acting freely just because persons who know us well can predict how we will act in various situations. So Mill is taking a compatibilist position of free will and determinism, i.e. our actions are determined, but we also can act freely in some sense.
B. Elimination of Misinterpretations
The Common View of Necessity contends that nothing can be changed. Mill rejects this view. He contends that if different causal circumstances occur, then human actions can change.
As regards the issue of “Fatalism” he contends that since our character is formed “for” us by causal circumstances, there is no point in struggling to change it. Mill rejects this view. He contends that to some extent, our character is formed “by” us. “His character is formed by his circumstances, . . . but his own desire to mold it in a particular way is one of those circumstances, and by no means one of the least influential.” So what “we” are has some bearing on changes that can come about; and there is no reason for fatalistic submission. Mill further argues that “this feeling of being able to modify our own character ‘if we wish’, is itself the feeling of moral freedom which are conscious of” and this makes possible the notion of moral responsibility, thus exhibiting Mill’s acceptance of a soft determinism.
